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Courts Beyond Judging
Michael C. Pollack
Across all fifty states, a woefully understudied institution of
government is responsible for a broad range of administrative,
legislative, law enforcement, and judicial functions. That
important institution is the state courts. While the literature has
examined the federal courts and federal judges from innumerable
angles, study of the state courts as institutions of state
government—and not merely as sources of doctrine and resolvers
of disputes—has languished. This Article remedies that oversight
by drawing attention for the first time to the wide array of roles
state courts serve, and by evaluating the suitability of both the
allocation of these tasks and the various procedures by which they
are carried out across the country.
In every state, on top of the ordinary adversarial disputeresolution function that we expect judges to serve, it is state court
judges who are charged with administrative functions like
approving applications to change one’s name, to enter the legal
profession, or to exercise constitutional rights like accessing
abortion care without parental knowledge or consent. And it is
often state court judges who are charged with or who have taken
on a range of legislative and policymaking functions like
redistricting and establishing specialized criminal courts for
veterans, persons in need of drug treatment, and others. And in
some states, it is state court judges who have the law enforcement
power to decide whether a prosecutor’s charging choice was a wise
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exercise of her discretion. These are not mere odds and ends of
governing either; weighty interests hang in the balance across
the board.
In addition to developing this more complete portrait of the
state courts—and of important variation in how these roles are
structured across the states—this Article examines whether the
interests at stake in each context are appropriately served when
state court judges handle them. In some arenas, they are, and this
Article places these facets of state court practice on firmer
theoretical footing. In others, however, there is cause for concern.
With respect to these tasks, this Article argues that state court
judges need to be better guided by statute and subject to reasongiving and record-developing requirements that would channel
their discretion, improve their decisionmaking, and enable more
rigorous appellate review. But most important of all, this Article
calls for states to make more conscious choices about structuring
the roles they assign to state courts, and for scholars to devote
more careful attention to these powerful and nuanced institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1966, a twenty-three-year-old New Yorker named Robert
Jama decided to change his name to Robert von Jama. He was not
trying to escape warrants or creditors, nor was he doing anything
else nefarious. Instead, he believed “von Jama” to have been his
family name before his ancestors immigrated to the United States
from Germany generations earlier. Evidently, he wished to honor
that heritage. He also socialized primarily with friends of German
origin and sought to fit in better with them.1
Jama wanted this change to be official, and like every state,
New York provides a process by which an adult can officially
change his name. So, Jama made his request to the appropriate
government entity, which is statutorily meant to grant the name
change if it is “satisfied” that the representations made in the
request are true “and that there is no reasonable objection to the
change of name proposed.”2 The government heard from no one in
opposition, but it was nonetheless not satisfied with the request.
Mr. Jama thus remained Mr. Jama. What was the “reasonable
objection” to the proposed name change? “The moral guilt of the
Germanic peoples in adopting the philosophies of a monstrosity
and his cohorts has not yet been fully eradicated or been
forgotten.”3 Having thus concluded what it means to be a “true”
American and what it means to be German, the government denied
Mr. Jama’s petition, declaring for good measure that his “reasons
for a change are puerile, if not pathetic.”4
Consider another story. Much more recently, a young woman
in Alabama desired an abortion. Because she lived in Alabama, she
needed a parent’s consent; such parental involvement in a minor’s
decision to have an abortion is required by law in forty-three
states.5 But because “her father had told her that if she ever came
home pregnant he would kill her,” and because “her mother was
also violent and had beaten her older sister until she bled,” she
believed her parents would “whip her and then kick her out of the
1. See JAY WEXLER, THE ODD CLAUSES 153–54 (2011).
2. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 63 (McKinney 2014).
3. In re Jama, 272 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1966).
4. Id.
5. See Reprod. Health Servs. v. Marshall, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1284–85 nn.17–18
(M.D. Ala. 2017); infra Section I.B.
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house if she told them she was pregnant.”6 Fortunately for this
young woman, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that, while a state
can permissibly make a minor’s decision to seek an abortion
contingent on her parent’s consent, such a state “also must provide
an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion
can be obtained.”7 Specifically, a minor seeking to bypass a parental
consent requirement is “entitled” to a confidential, anonymous,
and swift proceeding in which she can show either “that she is
mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion
decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her
parents’ wishes,” or “that even if she is not able to make [that]
decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her
best interests.”8
Alabama provides such a process, just like every other state,
and this young woman availed herself of it. She sought relief from
the appropriate government entity, explaining her reasons for
wanting an abortion without her parents’ knowledge and offering
factual support for her claim that she was sufficiently mature and
informed to make this decision on her own. No one appeared in
opposition, but the government nonetheless denied her request by
issuing a “predrawn form” stating that she was “not mature and
well informed enough to make the abortion decision” and that “the
performance of the abortion is not in the best interest of the minor.”9
Take three more short stories. First, in Illinois, the state
legislature could not agree on how to redraw the state legislative
district maps after the decennial census of 2000—just like it could
not agree after the censuses of 1980 and 1990.10 Many states provide
for a backup decisionmaker,11 so pursuant to Illinois law, the
backup decisionmaker named one Republican and one Democrat
and put those two names into a replica Lincoln stovepipe hat; the
name that was selected was tasked with breaking the logjam.12
6. In re Anonymous, 782 So. 2d 791, 791–92 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).
7. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).
8. Id. at 643–44.
9. In re Anonymous, 782 So. 2d at 792.
10. Ray Long & Michelle Manchir, Illinois Democrats, Republicans Offer Dueling
Redistricting Plans, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 26, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-0426/news/ct-met-illinois-redistricting-20100426_1_new-electoral-map-republicans-leagueof-women-voters.
11. See infra Section III.A.
12. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b).
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Second, in New York, officials grew concerned that veterans
struggling with post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain
injuries were not well-served by the traditional criminal justice
system—and that society was not particularly well-served by
processing such offending veterans through that system.13 As in
numerous other instances, those government officials established a
Veterans Court with a specialized docket, staff, and services
designed to better achieve justice and rehabilitation for those
offenders.14 Third and finally, when the COVID-19 pandemic made
holding the traditional in-person bar exam in the summer and fall
of 2020 a risky public health event for aspiring lawyers and their
families, government officials in some states decided to proceed
with the exam anyway, some to postpone the exam, some to move
it online, and others to offer various accommodations.15
Despite the wide diversity of subject matter, the surprising yet
common thread in all of these stories is that the government
decisionmakers were state court judges. Nearly every state’s
process for adult name changes runs, not through some records
office, but through a low-level state court.16 So it was Judge Maurice
Wahl of the New York City Civil Court who turned Mr. Jama
away.17 Nearly every state’s process for parental bypass in the
context of a minor seeking an abortion runs, not through the state’s
department of children and family services, but through the same
low-level state court.18 So it was a trial court judge who signed the
form declaring the young woman insufficiently mature to seek an
abortion without her parents’ involvement.19 Many states enlist
state court judges or justices of the supreme court to assist in or to
handle outright aspects of the legislative redistricting process,20 so
it has thrice been the Illinois Supreme Court that put the names in
13. See Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 GEO. L.J. 1481, 1492, 1495 (2017).
14. See id. at 1492–98, 1520–22.
15. See July 2020 Bar Exam: Jurisdiction Information, NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS
(Sept. 1, 2020, 2:35 PM), http://www.ncbex.org/ncbe-covid-19-updates/july-2020-bar-examjurisdiction-information.
16. See infra Section I.A. In Hawaii, this process runs through the Office of the
Lieutenant Governor. HAW. REV. STAT. § 574-5(b).
17. In re Jama, 272 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1966); see N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 63
(McKinney 2014).
18. See infra Section I.B.
19. See In re Anonymous, 782 So. 2d 791, 791 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).
20. See infra Section III.A.
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the stovepipe hat.21 Nearly all of the Veterans Courts—like a host
of other specialized courts, for example, for drug treatment—have
been established, not by state lawmakers, but by state court
judges.22 And the decisions about whether and how to proceed with
the bar exam during the pandemic were generally made, not by the
states’ professional licensing bureaus, but by the high courts of the
various states.23
This Article explores, frames, and critiques this understudied
and, indeed, largely unnoticed side of state court judging. To be
sure, it has long been recognized that, in contrast to the federal
government’s rigid, constitutionally rooted separation of powers,
the states have taken a “varied, pragmatic approach in establishing
governments” which often scrambles that traditional allocation.24
But even so, we understand far too little about this simple fact of
life in state courts: State court judges engage in decisionmaking in
a whole host of non-adversarial settings outside of the traditional
context of dispute resolution.25
While scholars of criminal law have studied specialized courts
and while scholars of abortion rights have studied the judicial
bypass, for example, these disparate threads have not adequately
been connected and used as a lens through which to better
21. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b).
22. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1492–98, 1520–22; infra Section III.B.
23. See, e.g., In re July 2020 Ala. Bar Examination, No. 19-20/118 (Ala. July 12, 2020); In
re July 2020 Ind. Bar Examination, No. 20S-CB-300 (Ind. May 7, 2020); In re Petition for Waiver
of the Bar Examination Requirement for Admission to the Bar and Provision of Emergency
Diploma Privilege, No. S-20-0495 (Neb. July 13, 2020); In re July 2020 Nev. State Bar
Examination, No. ADKT 0558 (Nev. May 20, 2020); In re Statewide Response by Wash. State
Cts. to the Covid-19 Pub. Health Emergency, No. 25700-B-630 (Wash. June 12, 2020); see also
NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS, supra note 15.
24. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 482–83 (1968) (quoting ROBERT C. WOOD,
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 891–92 (1965)); see Dreyer v. Illinois, 187
U.S. 71, 84 (1902); Farah Peterson, Interpretation as Statecraft: Chancellor Kent and the
Collaborative Era of American Statutory Interpretation, 77 MD. L. REV. 712, 717 (2018).
25. By claiming that judging tends to bring to mind this notion of adversarial dispute
resolution, I simply mean to capture the common conception of what it is that judges do—
particularly federal judges. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S 219, 227 (1988) (referring to
the “paradigmatic judicial acts” as those “involved in resolving disputes between parties
who have invoked the jurisdiction of a court”); Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 914 (9th
Cir. 1982) (describing the key “characteristic of the judicial process” as “the adjudication of
controversies between adversaries”); James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial
Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1357
(2015) (emphasizing that our conception of federal courts is that they “serve as tribunals for
the resolution of concrete disputes between adverse parties”).
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understand the state judiciary. A truly full picture of the state
judiciary must account for these unique, pervasive, and
underappreciated functions. Indeed, it is only by seeing state courts
for all that they are that scholars, citizens, advocates, and even
judges themselves can best engage with them, assess their work,
and contemplate how they might be designed and reformed so as
to best respect the full range of values and rights at stake.
And while too many articles to list have been written about how
judges operate, what pressures and constraints are imposed on
them, what incentives they face, how their decisions are reviewed,
and what their place is in a system of government, those articles
have largely investigated the traditional context of dispute
resolution and, more importantly, have focused on federal judges.26
But scholars have largely overlooked the need for a systematic
understanding of state court judges beyond traditional judging—
that is, as distinct institutions of state government with an array of
functions.27 And because states are not bound by the separation of
26. A significant literature examines the scope and constitutional propriety of the roles
that federal judges play outside of or adjacent to dispute resolution. See, e.g., Pfander & Birk,
supra note 25, at 1355 (reconciling such roles with Article III); Michael T. Morley, Consent of
the Governed or Consent of the Government? The Problems with Consent Decrees in GovernmentDefendant Cases, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 640–44 (2014) (arguing that “consent decrees raise
serious Article III concerns”); David L. Noll, MDL as Public Administration, 118 MICH. L. REV.
403, 410 (2019) (arguing in the multidistrict litigation context that “Article III
courts . . . perform functions that are commonly thought to be the province of administrative
agencies and executive departments”); Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme
Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188
(2012) (discussing the Supreme Court’s role in setting civil procedure policy). Similar
attention is warranted at the state level, and this Article contributes to filling that gap.
27. Cf. Justin Weinstein-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1034
(2020) (“Despite the[] massive stakes . . . [and] the compelling human stories that unfold in
these [state and local] courts, we know very little about them.”); Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica
Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Marx, Studying the “New” Civil Judges, 2018 WIS. L.
REV. 249, 250, 265–72 (2018) (observing that “we know very little about our state courts” and
offering possible explanations); Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 483, 488 (2017) (observing the “unique and understudied institutional context of
states”); Ethan J. Leib, Local Judges and Local Government, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 707,
708–09 (2015) (noting the dearth of attention paid by scholars to local courts and to state trial
courts); Stephen C. Yeazell, Courting Ignorance: Why We Know So Little About Our Most
Important Courts, 143 DAEDALUS 129 (2014) (same); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional
Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 207–08 (1983) (“A major focus of the study of state
constitutional law . . . should be on the nonadjudicatory functions of state supreme courts.”).
Two important exceptions to the general scholarly inattention to state courts are
Zachary Clopton’s study of the role that state courts play in the making of civil procedure
rules in the states and Andrew Crespo’s evaluation of the role of state courts in making
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powers constraints that exist at the federal level, they have the
freedom to experiment with different allocations of roles. It is
precisely that broad latitude, and its potential to be used in both
beneficial and problematic ways, that cries out for closer attention.
This Article answers that call. It begins by describing three
categories of state court functions that go beyond the typical
context of resolving adversarial disputes. First are quasiadministrative roles like deciding name change applications,
governing minors’ access to abortions, and admitting and
disciplining attorneys. These are generally ex parte, and they
involve a citizen seeking a statutorily offered benefit or license from
his or her government by demonstrating that he or she satisfies
certain stated criteria. The analogy to the perhaps more familiar
federal level would be a person applying for disability benefits
from the Social Security Administration.28 Second is the executive
criminal procedure rules in the states. See Zachary D. Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure,
104 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2018) (noting that, while “state procedure-making has been
understudied,” “state courts matter” and play varied roles in making civil procedure);
Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 1379–
88 (2018) (observing that state courts are “frequently the primary and supreme enactors of
the procedural codes” regulating prosecutorial power). These complementary pieces each
zero in on a specific function of state courts beyond dispute resolution—ones that, albeit with
some departures, characterize the federal judiciary as well. See Clopton, supra, at 19 (“The
broad strokes of state procedure-making have much in common with the federal system.”);
Crespo, supra, at 1383–84 (noting that federal courts likewise make rules of criminal
procedure but that, in many states, courts have the additional power to “override
legislatively enacted statutes”). This Article, by contrast, takes a cross-cutting perspective on
state court functions without analog in the federal judiciary. Moreover, Clopton and Crespo
aim their attention outwards, looking to the implications of these rulemaking roles for civil
and criminal litigation, while this Article looks inwards, leveraging that synthetic analysis to
improve our understanding of the state courts themselves as institutions of government.
Another exception is Helen Hershkoff’s work on justiciability in the state courts.
See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001). Hershkoff makes tremendously important descriptive and
normative claims about the doctrines governing access to state courts, see id. at 1838–41, but
even the sustained attention she affords to the state courts likewise misses the functions
beyond dispute resolution that this Article surfaces. That same focus on dispute resolution
and litigation functions continues to animate more recent significant work about state and
local courts. See, e.g., Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter, Simplified Courts Can’t Solve
Inequality, 148 DAEDALUS 128, 130–31 (2019) (focusing on dispute resolution but
observing that even resolving disputes necessarily pulls state courts into broader
socioeconomic problems like inequality, tenant insecurity, domestic violence, mental illness,
drug abuse, and more); Carpenter et al., supra, at 254; Weinstein-Tull, supra, at 1042–45;
Leib, supra, at 734.
28. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., DISABILITY BENEFITS (2019), https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/
EN-05-10029.pdf.
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law enforcement function of exercising discretion in choosing
whether or not to prosecute someone. Third and finally are quasilegislative roles like redistricting and establishing specialized
criminal courts. These involve enacting the law, setting the ground
rules under which citizens interact with government, and, again,
doing so outside of the context of dispute resolution. For each
function and category, this Article documents significant variation
in how the fifty states structure their courts’ roles, both to paint
a more complete picture and, more importantly, to open our eyes
to the spectrum of possible arrangements—and the good and bad
in them.
Of course, there are absolutely other state court functions that
fall into these categories. These examples are simply meant to
illustrate the three hats that state court judges wear in addition, to
mix sartorial metaphors, to the traditional black robes of dispute
resolution. Two other caveats are worth emphasizing at this point,
too. First, this sorting is not meant to suggest that any sort of
separation of powers principle is violated by allocating these tasks
to judges; recall that states are not bound by the same bright lines
by which the federal government is bound under the U.S.
Constitution. Rather, this sorting is meant to capture the nature of
the task at issue. Second, the lines between these categories are
certainly far from bright and I do not mean to suggest otherwise.
All of these tasks share some qualities, so these groupings are
meant primarily to distinguish between likes and less-likes, to
facilitate comparison both within contexts—where shared features
often drive shared analysis—and across contexts, and to guide the
normative evaluation at the heart of the Article.
And that normative evaluation starts by recognizing that, more
than being a mere curiosity of state law, these judicially allocated
tasks carry great weight for the individuals and families in
question. They also touch on rights and values of constitutional
dimension. This nearly goes without saying in the context of
minors’ access to abortion.29 But the impact does not stop there.
When it comes to the regulation and discipline of attorneys, issues
of privacy and due process may arise, and the practical import for

29. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Bellotti II,
443 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1979).
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the careers and finances of the attorneys themselves is substantial.30
An adult’s desire to change his or her name may implicate
significant First Amendment self-expression values, LGBT rights
issues, and a host of dignitary and practical consequences for
identification cards, voting rolls, school records, and the like.31
Redistricting raises serious political association, equal protection,
and voting rights concerns.32 And so on.
With these substantial impacts in mind—and with the
foundation that the nature of these tasks means they could all
coherently be said to belong just as logically, if not more so, in some
other decisionmaker’s wheelhouse—this Article turns to evaluate
how they each ought to be understood and treated if one were
writing on a clean slate. Drawing on the interests each task
implicates, how much and what type of accountability we might
want the decisionmaker to face, the breadth of the discretion we
might want the decisionmaker to exercise in individual cases, and
the need for expertise in each subject area, the Article assesses from
an institutional design perspective what the architecture of
decisionmaking ought to look like in each setting. This analysis
embraces not only who the best decisionmaker might be, but what
procedural constraints might be most appropriate for the
decisionmaker in each setting. Should the interested individual be
entitled to receive a decision supported by reasons rooted in the
facts? Should the decisionmaker be bound to consider a set of
externally defined criteria or should she have unfettered
discretion?33 Should the decisionmaker be democratically

30. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (“Suspension of issued licenses thus
involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the
licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
31. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (“[Fundamental]
liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”); In re Powell,
945 N.Y.S.2d 789 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (name change application made by transgender
person); In re Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2002) (name change applications made by a
same-sex couple).
32. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1938 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring);
Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 152–53 (1993); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
565–66 (1964).
33. To analogize to the federal level, for example, administrative agencies have to
justify their decisions by reference to statutory criteria and reasons rooted in a record of
evidence. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
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accountable? Should the individual be entitled to some form of
appellate review of a negative decision? What standard of review
ought to apply?
For the law enforcement role studied here, this Article
concludes that the state judiciary is indeed a fairly well-situated
decisionmaker. Even though there is room to improve elements of
the decisionmaking process, this conclusion puts this atypical facet
of the state courts on a stronger theoretical footing. For the quasilegislative roles, this Article offers a more mixed verdict, justifying
state redistricting practices while arguing that the state courts are
decidedly second-best decisionmakers with respect to establishing
specialized criminal courts. But for all of the quasi-administrative
roles examined here, this Article contends that state courts are
poorly situated to do the jobs demanded of them, at least as those
jobs are often currently framed. It is therefore critical to change how
state court judges are instructed to perform these tasks, the
procedures they employ in doing so, and the manner in which their
decisions are reviewed—both by other state courts and, in the
attorney admission and discipline context in particular, by federal
courts.34 Simply put, state court judges should, in these contexts,
apply strict legislatively defined criteria and should act and be
reviewed like other administrative decisionmakers making the
same sorts of decisions. Failing that, these roles should be
reassigned to other institutions better equipped to afford processes
that respect the values at stake.
To be sure, one might reach a different conclusion about the
particular processes that are owed or appropriate in some or all of
the contexts; taking a firm line on those details is not this Article’s
ultimate aim. Rather, this Article endeavors to shine a light on the
roles assigned to the state judiciary, to prompt a careful
reevaluation of them, to provide a framework to structure that
conversation, and to use that framework to generate a set of
proposals that might improve these decisionmaking processes. But
wherever this conversation leads, we must recognize the
importance of the question, be open to finding that existing
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Judges, by contrast, do not, at least not when their decisions are being
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1169 (2017).
34. See infra Section IV.C.3 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in the wellknown federal jurisdiction case, D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), be
overruled).
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processes may fall short in some or all of these arenas, and be
prepared either to offer process-based reforms within the judiciary
or to conclude that another decisionmaker entirely is better situated
to handle the task at issue.
This Article proceeds in four parts. The first three endeavor to
get a handle on the scope of state court judging as it departs from
the traditional dispute-resolution paradigm. Together, they dive
deep into six of the tasks assigned to state court judges. In so doing,
they explore variation across the fifty states, not only for descriptive
purposes, but in order to draw on the so-called “laboratories” of
democracy to enable the evaluation of what is possible.35 That is,
even once a state has chosen to entrust its judiciary with a particular
task, it can choose to provide more or fewer or different fetters, or
greater or lesser review, for that task. Understanding what has been
done can inspire possible avenues for reform. Part I takes on three
of the quasi-administrative tasks of the state court judge: deciding
name change applications, governing minors’ access to abortions,
and admitting and disciplining attorneys. Part II addresses the state
court judge’s law enforcement power to decide whom to prosecute
and whom not to prosecute. And Part III turns its sights on two
newly salient quasi-legislative tasks of the state court judge:
assisting with the redistricting process and establishing new
criminal courts. Part IV then examines each from an institutional
design perspective, comparing both within and across categories.
Considering the interests each implicates, and the desirability of
accountability, expertise, and discretion in each context, this final
Part either defends the judge’s seemingly peculiar role or
recommends a range of reforms.
I. THE STATE JUDGE AS ADMINISTRATOR
Suppose that you wanted to hold a parade down a town’s
Main Street. Suppose further that you didn’t know anything
specific about that town’s or that state’s law, but that you had some
vague idea that such a thing would require some sort of permission
35. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 1171 (1993) (“[T]he
study of the structural features of state constitutions can enable us to consider alternative
means of organizing representative democratic governments, assess the efficacy of different
mechanisms for governing, and illuminate the implications and consequences of aspects of
the federal government’s structure that we ordinarily take for granted.”).
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from the government. Who would you go to in order to get
permission to hold your parade? More likely than not, you would
think that some government bureaucrat would be in charge of
issuing or denying permits. You would probably expect there to be
some Department of Parades that had responsibility for parade
oversight, safety, and permission. In short, based on intuition if
nothing else, you would expect there to be some kind of
administrative agency charged with the parade portfolio.
And you would be correct. In New York City, for example, the
Street Activity Permit Office issues permits for festivals, block
parties, farmers’ markets, and parades.36 In addition, depending on
the type of parade, the event organizer may also need a permit from
the city’s Police Department, Department of Transportation, and
Department of Buildings, and the State Department of Health.37 The
same is true—albeit on a smaller scale—even in small towns like
Grand Marais, Minnesota.38
Applications of this sort—in which a citizen seeks a statutorily
offered benefit or license from his or her government by
demonstrating ex parte that he or she satisfies certain stated
criteria—are the bread and butter of administrative
decisionmaking. But upon closer inspection, to apply for a number
of state government permissions or benefits, one must turn, not to
a state or local administrative agency, but to a state or local judge.
When it comes to these arenas, then, these judges are effectively the
administrators of the Department of Parades.
Moreover, they serve this administrative function in a number
of contexts, often not because of some careful legislative choice, but
rather because, until relatively recently in the scale of the nation’s
history, the courts were the only game in town—the only organ of
the state government that existed in communities throughout the

36. NYC CITYWIDE EVENT COORDINATION & MGMT.,
Permit
Types,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/cecm/permitting/permit-types.page.
37. NYC CITYWIDE EVENT COORDINATION & MGMT., Supporting Permitting Agencies,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/cecm/permitting/supporting-permitting-agencies.page
38. In Grand Marais, population 1,351, the Parks Office requires the completion
of a special event permit application before one uses park space for special events.
CITY
OF
GRAND
MARAIS,
MINNESOTA,
https://www.ci.grand-marais.mn.us/;
GRAND
MARAIS
RECREATION
AREA,
Grand
Marais
City
Parks,
https://www.grandmaraisrecreationarea.com/more-info.
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state.39 With the maturation of the modern administrative state,
it is past time to assess just what these functions are and to ask
whether this vestige of history continues to make sense.
A. Name Change Applications
Much like hosting a parade, when a person wants to officially
change his name, he must ask the government for permission. If he
simply wants to assume the surname of his spouse, all he generally
has to do is indicate as much on the couple’s marriage license and
then inform other relevant federal and state agencies after the
marriage.40 Marriage licenses are usually issued by state or local
government agencies—in New York City, for example, the
Marriage Bureau in the Office of the City Clerk does so—as a matter
of course.41 Like getting a driver’s license—or a parade permit—all
one needs to do is bring the necessary documentation, check off
boxes on a form, and wait for a bureaucratic actor to affix a rubber
stamp. This process is simple for the applicant and
nondiscretionary for the government administrator.
One might therefore assume that a similar process is implicated
if a person wishes to change his or her first or middle name. Of
course, one might replace the Marriage Bureau with the
Department of Records or perhaps even the Department of Motor
Vehicles, but what likely leaps to mind is a government agency of
that sort. In forty-nine states and the District of Columbia, however,
that would be wrong.
39. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 76 (1994) (noting that eighteenth-century courts “handled matters that
today would be within the executive branch, not primarily because of some principled
reason,” but because of the “administrative ease in relying upon the existing court
structures”); see also Hershkoff, supra note 27, at 1871; Pfander & Birk, supra note 25, at 1412–
13; Hendrik Hartog, The Public Law of a County Court: Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century
Massachusetts, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 282, 282–87 (1976); cf. Maureen E. Brady, The Forgotten
History of Metes and Bounds, 128 YALE L.J. 872, 912 n.208 (2019) (noting that colonial judges
“resolved disputes and serious criminal allegations but ‘combined judicial, legislative, and
executive functions’”); Peterson, supra note 24, at 717 (showing “state judges in powersharing arrangements with their legislatures” throughout the early 1800s). The state courts’
role in attorney admission and discipline, however, has been the subject of more recent
contestation and concerted choice. See infra notes 110–122 and accompanying text.
40. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of
Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 817–19 (2007).
41. Marriage License, OFF. OF THE CITY CLERK, N.Y.C., https://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/
html/marriage/license.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2020).

732

2.POLLACK_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

733

3/27/2021 1:44 AM

Courts Beyond Judging

In nearly every jurisdiction, a person who wants to officially
change his or her name in circumstances other than a change
of surname due to marriage must file a petition before a state
court judge.42 This judge is often a probate judge, family court
judge, general jurisdiction county judge, or some other nonappellate judge.43 And as the following discussion illustrates,
nearly all employ a functionally non-adversarial process: The judge
will make the decision based entirely on the representations in the
applicant’s petition in light of the rules (or lack thereof) imposed by
state law. That petition generally must state the reasons for the
desired change—either because state law requires as much,44 or
because form petitions include a place for the applicant to provide
reasons.45 Finally, once the judge reaches a decision, a dissatisfied
applicant can appeal to a higher state court that will generally
review the judge’s initial decision under a highly deferential “abuse
of discretion” standard.46
Beyond these commonalities, though, the states diverge into
what we might call shall-issue jurisdictions, may-issue
jurisdictions, and a grab bag of other approaches. Let us begin with
the jurisdictions—running the gamut from blue to red, big to small,
eastern to western, and everywhere in between—that use the
seemingly discretion-limiting word “shall” in their name change
statutes. About half of those provide that the judge shall grant the
name change if there are no good reasons not to do so.47 Some of
these leave it up to the judge to determine what those reasons might
42. I say “officially” because a person is generally permitted to “go by” any name he
or she chooses as a matter of custom or informal social choice. I am therefore discussing here
only the steps necessary to have one’s name changed as a matter of law and public record.
The Hawaii exception is discussed infra p. 737.
43. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-C, § 1-701(1) (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 547:3-i(I) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-49-10(A) (1990); W. VA. CODE § 48-25-101(a) (2013).
44. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-601(A) (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-12-1(b) (2017);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1402(a) (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.270 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-8-102 (1978).
45. Alabama, for example, offers a form requesting, among other things, “why you
want to change your name.” ALA. STATE BAR, PS-12: REQUEST TO CHANGE NAME (FOR AN
ADULT) (Aug. 2008), https://eforms.alacourt.gov/media/jtzbncuw/request-to-changename.pdf.
46. See, e.g., In re Mayol, 137 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004); In re Parrott, 392
S.E.2d 48, 48 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); In re Reed, 584 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979);
In re Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind. 1974).
47. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 12 (1977); MINN. STAT. § 259.11(a) (2005);
OR. REV. STAT. § 33.410 (1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-217(C) (2015).
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be. For example, New York’s statute provides, “If the court to
which the petition is presented is satisfied thereby, . . . that there is
no reasonable objection to the change of name proposed, . . . the court
shall make an order authorizing the petitioner to assume the name
proposed.”48 Others of these go further and explicitly define what
objections might be reasonable. Oklahoma’s statute, for example,
says that “the prayer of the petition shall be granted unless the
court or judge finds that the change is sought for an illegal or
fraudulent purpose, or that a material allegation in the petition
is false.”49
But while the statutes in these states share a presumption that a
requested change be granted unless the judge finds reasons not to
grant it,50 the other half of the “shall-issue” jurisdictions flip the
presumption: the name change shall be granted only if the judge
finds good cause to do so.51 For example, Colorado’s statute states
that a court in receipt of a petition for a name change “shall order
the name change . . . if the court is satisfied that the desired change
would be proper and not detrimental to the interests of any other
person.”52 Likewise, the statute in Kansas provides that “[if] there
is reasonable cause for changing the name of the petitioner the
judge shall so order.”53 These states thus appear to place a burden
of persuasion on the petitioner in a way that the states in the first
group do not.54
To be sure, practice sometimes matches statutory text and
sometimes does not. When it does, courts either tightly enforce the
limited grounds for denial in that state’s statute or embrace the
statute’s broader latitude.55 When it does not, courts sometimes
48. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 63 (2014) (emphasis added).
49. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1634 (1953).
50. See In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579, 583 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2001) (“[T]he exercise of
discretion to deny change of name is contrary to the common law and statutory policy in
favor of granting such relief.”).
51. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 527.270 (1939); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,271(3) (2018);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-37-5 (1960); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-25-101 (2013).
52. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-15-101(2)(a) (2016).
53. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1402(c) (1990).
54. This is not to say that the burden is particularly weighty. For example, Kansas
courts have indicated that “[t]he name change provisions do not require a demonstration of
some compelling reason for the change,” but instead simply demand a showing of
reasonable cause. In re Morehead, 706 P.2d 480, 481–82 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985).
55. See Libby Adler, T: Appending Transgender Equal Rights to Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Equal Rights, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 595, 614 n.80 (2010) (observing that, in New York,
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conclude that, notwithstanding narrow statutory language, they
have “inherent authority to deny” a name change petition if the
chosen name is “racist, obscene, or otherwise likely to provoke
violence, arouse passions, or inflame hatred,” even though none of
those conditions are present in the state’s statute.56 Or they
conclude, even in the face of fairly open-ended language, that there
are “very limited bases for denying a statutory name change
application” and that “policy-based or philosophical objections to
individual name changes” are not proper grounds for denial.57
These ambiguities in application would matter more if one were
trying to strictly categorize the states. They matter less for present
purposes, which are instead to get a handle on the categories of
existing approaches.
Putting these “shall-issue” states to the side, we can turn to the
jurisdictions that use the more discretionary word “may” in their
statutes. About half of these leave matters entirely open-ended and
simply provide that the judge “may” grant the name change, full
stop.58 For example, Indiana provides that the courts “may change
the names of natural persons on application by petition,”59 and its
supreme court has explicitly held that “[t]here is no statutory
requirement in Indiana that the petitioner establish any particular
reason other than his personal desire for [a] change of name.”60
A handful go a step further and provide that the judge “may” grant
“the judicial procedure vests significant discretion in judges to limit access to name
changes”). Compare In re Harvey, 293 P.3d 224, 225 (Okla. Civ. App. 2012) (reversing a trial
court’s denial of a name change petition filed by a transgender person, in a state with a
narrow-discretion statute, because the statute provides that the only permissible bases for
such a denial are fraud or illegality, neither of which is present when one simply wishes to
“identify[] oneself by a traditionally male or female name while having the DNA of the other
sex”), with In re Bobrowich, No. 159/02, 2003 WL 230701, at *3 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Jan. 6, 2003)
(rejecting a petition to change one’s name to “Steffi Owned Slave” in a state that does
not tightly define what makes an application unreasonable because the judge feared
that granting the petition would “attach the imprimatur of the court to that individual’s
political philosophy”).
56. In re Dengler, 287 N.W.2d 637, 639 (Minn. 1979).
57. In re Zhan, 37 A.3d 521, 524 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
58. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-11(a) (2014); KY. REV. STAT. § 401.010 (2013);
N.H. REV. STAT. § 547:3-i(I) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-8-104 (1978). Maine adds a slight
twist, providing that a judge “may not” change a person’s name if the judge concludes that
the person’s motives are “contrary to the public interest.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-C,
§ 1-701(6) (2020).
59. IND. CODE § 34-28-2-1 (2017).
60. In re Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 859 (Ind. 1974).
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the change upon a showing by the applicant of good cause.61
And another handful provide that the judge “may” grant the
change if there is no good reason not to do so.62
Finally, there are the states that do not fit neatly in either the
shall-issue or may-issue camps. Most still place judges at the center
of the process, though. Two states grant judges authority to decide
whether a name change application should be granted but defy
easy categorization.63 Another state provides that a judge “may”
change a person’s name, but its statute also lists a narrow set of
specific criteria the judge “shall” consider.64 A few states are silent
as to how the judge’s authority should be exercised.65 And in
Louisiana, the judge has the discretion to render a decision on a
name change application as she sees fit,66 but the process is actually
adversarial—the statute provides that the proceedings “shall be
carried on contradictorily with the district attorney,” whose role is
to “represent the state” and who “shall be served with a copy of the
petition and citation to answer the same.”67 Finally, on the other
end of the spectrum, in Vermont, an applicant must appear before
a judge, but simply to sign a form before the judge which “shall”
thereafter be filed.68 The judge is given no power to deny
the application.

61. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2503(a) (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 711.1(1) (2020); OHIO
REV. CODE § 2717.01(A)(3) (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 42-1-2 (1953); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-25-103(a) (2007). Here, too, some state courts interpret these statutes more strictly than
the wording may suggest. See, e.g., In re Porter, 31 P.3d 519, 521 (Utah 2001) (ordering trial
court to grant a name change to Santa Claus and holding that applications under the state’s
“may”-issue statute should “generally be granted unless sought for a wrongful or fraudulent
purpose” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
62. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 5904(a) (2018); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101(d)
(2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-8-1 (1989); WIS. STAT. § 786.36(1) (2018).
63. See S.C. CODE § 15-49-20(C) (2006) (“[T]he judge must determine and grant or
refuse the name change as the judge considers proper, having a due regard to the true
interest of the petitioner and protection of the public.”). Compare ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.010
(1986) (providing that a name change “may not be made unless the court finds sufficient
reasons for the change and also finds it consistent with the public interest”), with ALASKA R.
CIV. P. 84(c) (2014) (“If satisfied that there is no reasonable objection to the assumption of
another name by petitioner, the court shall by judgment authorize petitioner to assume such
other name”).
64. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-601(A), (C) (2011).
65. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 68.07 (2016); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-22-28 (1991).
66. LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4753 (2019).
67. Id. § 13:4752.
68. VT. STAT. tit. 15, § 811 (2011).
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One state keeps the power in the courts but shifts it away from
the judge. In North Carolina, the clerk of the court—not the judge
herself—is designated as the initial recipient of a name change
application, and the clerk has the “duty” not to grant the application
if he finds that good reasons exist for denying it.69 The clerk must,
however, afford the applicant with reasons for a denial, at which
point the applicant may appeal the clerk’s decision to the local
judge, whose decision on the matter is “final” and not appealable
any further.70
Finally, in Hawaii, the power resides entirely outside the courts.
There, a person who wishes to change his name must petition the
Office of the Lieutenant Governor.71 The Lieutenant Governor has
promulgated regulations setting out the information an applicant
must provide—including the reasons for the requested change—
and allowing for the possibility that the Lieutenant Governor will
deny the petition.72 Those regulations, however, are silent about the
bases on which such a denial may be grounded and about the
breadth of discretion available on that score. Rather, they simply
state that a denial will be accompanied by reasons and that an
unsuccessful applicant has the right to seek rehearing.73
B. Minors’ Access to Abortion
Of the forty-three states with statutes on the books that require
parental involvement—either consent or notification—in a minor’s
decision to seek an abortion, forty-two provide for that parental
involvement to be “bypassed” if a particular governmental actor
approves of the decision being made without the requisite parental
involvement.74 Just as with name changes, if one did not know
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 101-2(a), 101-5(f) (2014–15).
70. Id. § 101-5(f). The statute also provides that an unsuccessful applicant is not
permitted to reapply for another year, id., and that a successful applicant is not permitted to
reapply for another name change ever again. Id. § 101-6(a) (“No person shall be allowed to
change his name under this Chapter but once . . . .”).
71. HAW. REV. STAT. § 574-5(a)(1), (b) (2014). That Office provides a simple online
portal and instructional video to guide applicants through the process. See Name Change
Application, LT. GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF HAW.: JOSH GREEN, https://namechange.ehawaii
.gov/public/welcome.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2020).
72. HAW. CODE R. §§ 2-2-2, 2-2-6 (1987).
73. Id. § 2-2-6.
74. Maryland law provides that a physician may perform an abortion on a minor
without notice to the minor’s parent if, in the physician’s judgment, (a) notice “may lead to
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better, one might think this government actor would be an
administrator from, say, the state’s health department or child and
family welfare department. The thing being sought by the minor is,
after all, akin to a permit. But, just as with name changes, the
statutorily authorized government actor here is uniformly a state
court judge.
This regime of parental involvement coupled with judgecontrolled bypass is best reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1979
decision in Bellotti v. Baird. In that case, a challenge to a
Massachusetts abortion regulation statute, the Court held that a
state can permissibly make a minor’s decision to seek an abortion
contingent on her parent’s consent. However, the Court held that if
a state does so, it “also must provide an alternative procedure
whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained.”75
Specifically, a minor seeking to bypass a parental consent
requirement is “entitled” to a confidential, anonymous, and swift
proceeding in which she can show either “that she is mature
enough and well enough informed to make her abortion
decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her
parents’ wishes,” or “that even if she is not able to make [that]
decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her
best interests.”76
While the Court thus made explicit that a minor is entitled to an
opportunity to convince the state government to waive the parental
consent that would otherwise be required, and while it set out the
standards to which a state can permissibly hold a minor attempting
to make that showing, it did not say which component of state
government must serve as the decisionmaker. Because
Massachusetts law already involved state superior court judges in
minors’ abortion decisions—albeit in ways the Court ultimately
found to inadequately safeguard a pregnant minor’s rights—the
Court framed this bypass procedure by reference to a proceeding

physical or emotional abuse of the minor,” (b) the minor is “mature and capable of giving
informed consent to an abortion,” or (c) notice would not be in the minor’s “best interest.”
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-103(c)(1) (1991). The jurisdictions that do not require any
form of parental involvement are Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii,
New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. See Reprod. Health Servs. v.
Marshall, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1284–85 n.17 (M.D. Ala. 2017).
75. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).
76. Id. at 643–44.
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before a judge.77 The Court made clear, however, “that a State
choosing to require parental consent” is entitled to “delegate the
alternative procedure to a juvenile court or an administrative
agency or officer.”78 In fact, the Court recognized that it could be
beneficial if a state were to “employ[] procedures and a forum less
formal than those associated with a court of general jurisdiction.”79
Nearly every state has nonetheless chosen to entrust this
procedure to its judges, and everywhere but Alabama, the
proceedings are structured in approximately the same way.80
Rather than fill out a form and meet with a counselor at the state’s
health department, a minor wishing to pursue an abortion without
the notification or consent of her parent must take the “daunting”
and “intimidating” step of filing a petition with a state court judge
that sets out her desire to bypass her parents.81 The petition is filed
anonymously or pseudonymously,82 and minors are to be informed
that they have the right to court-appointed counsel (and sometimes
guardians ad litem as well) upon request.83 The petition will be
77. Id. at 643 n.22.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. While a number of states require parental consent to a minor’s abortion, see, for
example, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2152(A) (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(a) (2014); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1061.14(A) (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-31(A) (1990), some require only parental
notification, see, for example, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783(1) (1995); MINN. STAT. § 144.343(2)
(2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.255(1) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.85(A) (2013). But this
distinction has no apparent effect on the ways in which states structure their bypass
proceedings. Moreover, while the Supreme Court has “not decided whether parental notice
statutes must contain” the same bypass opportunities that parental consent statutes do, Ohio
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510 (1990), every state in this category in fact
provides an opportunity for bypass of a notification requirement. See Reprod. Health Servs.
v. Marshall, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1285 n.18 (M.D. Ala. 2017).
81. Kate Coleman-Minahan, Amanda Jean Stevenson, Emily Obront & Susan Hays,
Young Women’s Experiences Obtaining Judicial Bypass for Abortion in Texas, 64 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 20 (2019); Molly Redden, This is How Judges Humiliate Pregnant Teens Who Want
Abortions, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10
/teen-abortion-judicial-bypass-parental-notification/ (“‘“Daunting” doesn’t begin to cover
it,’ says Jennifer Dalven, who runs the reproductive rights arm of the American Civil
Liberties Union. ‘Imagine it: You’re 17 years old. You’re already struggling with this
unplanned pregnancy. You may be afraid of your parents. And now you’re told,
“Go to court”?’”).
82. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(c) (2014); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.14(B)(3)(a)
(2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(3) (2007).
83. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-809(b)(1)(B), (C) (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 132:34(II)(a) (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-740.3(B) (2013); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-10-304(c)(1) (2020).
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considered and ruled upon by the judge ex parte within a
statutorily set and very short period of time (typically a few days
at most), and if the judge fails to do so, the petition is often
deemed granted.84 If the judge wishes to hold a hearing before
issuing a decision, the minor is entitled to appear at that hearing in
a closed setting and with her attorney.85 With specific allowances
for the time-sensitive and confidentiality-sensitive context, then,
this structure is similar to that which attends a name change request
in that both involve the judge acting as the decisionmaker on a onesided petition that is entirely removed from any pending or
imminent litigation.
But whereas many state court judges enjoy fairly wide
discretion with respect to name change requests, their discretion
tends to be somewhat more cabined in this context—at least
formally, according to the terms of the relevant statutes. When it
comes to the judge’s decisionmaking authority to bypass parental
involvement in a minor’s abortion decision, many of the states
instruct their judges in similar fashions. Echoing the language of
Bellotti, these states provide—to take Colorado as an example—that
“any judge of a court of competent jurisdiction shall” order that the
requisite parental involvement be waived “if the judge determines
that [such involvement] will not be in the best interest of the minor,
or if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
minor is sufficiently mature to decide whether to have an
abortion.”86 That is, the factors to be considered are explicit, as is
the judge’s duty to grant. Further, mirroring the reason-giving
requirements and demands for supporting evidence that are the
bread and butter of administrative law,87 nearly all of these states
84. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1784(c) (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-683 (2014);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/25(c) (1995).
85. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 135L.3(3)(c) (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(c) (2014);
ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 1597-A(6)(C) (2020).
86. COLO. REV. STAT. §13-22-707(1)(a) (2018); see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-684(c)
(2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135L.3(3)(e) (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(4) (2007);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-304(e) (2020).
87. See, e.g., T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 819 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“One such [administrative law] principle, as the Court explains, is the
requirement that agencies give reasons.”); 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(A) (“All decisions, including
initial, recommended, and tentative decisions, are a part of the record and shall include a
statement of findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material
issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.”); see also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-4-104(8), (10) (2018) (requiring any state agency making a decision to deny, revoke, or
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go on to require the judge to include in the order “specific factual
findings and legal conclusions in support thereof.”88
For the remaining states, this statutory structuring of the
judges’ decisionmaking is even more involved. Rather than just set
out a standard that judges must find a minor to satisfy in order to
be freed from the applicable parental involvement requirement,
these legislatures have listed specific factors that the judge must
consider. In Florida, for example, a judge is required to consider the
minor’s age, intelligence, “emotional development and stability,”
“credibility and demeanor as a witness,” “ability to accept
responsibility,” “ability to assess both the immediate and longrange consequences of the minor’s choices,” and “ability to
understand and explain the medical risks of terminating her
pregnancy and to apply that understanding to her decision.”89 The
judge is also required to consider “[w]hether there may be any
undue influence by another on the minor’s decision to have an
abortion.”90 The other states in this category have statutes which
largely mirror that language.91 But in Kansas, which imposes the
most elaborate instructions, the judge “shall take into account the
minor’s experience level, perspective and judgment,” along with
her “age, experience working outside the home, living away from
home, traveling on her own, handling personal finances, and
making other significant decisions.”92 And in so doing, the judge
“shall consider . . . what steps the minor has taken to explore her
options and the extent to which she considered and weighed the
potential consequences of each option,” “[the minor’s] conduct
since learning of her pregnancy,” and “her intellectual ability to
understand her options and to make informed decisions.”93
suspend a license to provide written notice along with “the grounds therefor”);
id. § 24-4-105(14)(a) (requiring agency decisions be rooted in a factual record).
88. COLO. REV. STAT. §13-22-707(1)(a) (2018); see also IOWA CODE § 135L.3(3)(f) (2015);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(5) (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-304(f) (2020).
89. FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(c)(1) (2020).
90. Id. § 390.01114(4)(c)(2).
91. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(3)(e) (2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.028(2)(2)
(2019); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(f)(4) (1992). A few other states list factors that a judge “may”
consider. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2152(C) (2014). And Oklahoma actually forbids a
judge from considering “the potential financial impact on the pregnant unemancipated
minor or the family of the pregnant unemancipated minor if she does not have an abortion.”
63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-740.3(A) (2013).
92. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(n) (2014).
93. Id.
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Finally, Alabama employs a notably distinct procedure.94
Unlike all the other states,95 the court is required upon receipt of a
minor’s petition to “immediately notify the district attorney’s office
of the county in which the minor is a resident, or the county where
the petition was filed of the filing of the petition on the day of such
filing” so that the district attorney “shall participate as an advocate
for the state to examine the petitioner and any witnesses, and to
present evidence for the purpose of providing the court with a
sufficient record upon which to make an informed decision and to
do substantial justice.”96 Alabama is thus the only state in the nation
in which these proceedings are not ex parte. Moreover, the court is
also permitted by statute to appoint a guardian ad litem, not merely
for the minor petitioner, but “for the interests of the unborn child,”
and that guardian ad litem “shall have the same rights and
obligations of participation in the proceeding as given to the district
attorney’s office.”97 And while the minor’s parents are not to be
contacted by the court—for that would defeat the purpose of the
hearing’s confidential nature98—the statute provides that, if the
minor’s parents are already aware of the proceeding, they “shall be
given notice of and be permitted to participate” in the proceeding
“with all of the rights and obligations of any party to the
proceeding.”99 And finally, any party in the proceeding—which
can include the district attorney, the guardian ad litem for the fetus,
and the minor’s parents—can request and receive a delay in the
proceedings for up to one business day, “unless justice requires an
extension thereof.”100
Whatever the merits or demerits of Alabama’s unique
framework—and many of the components highlighted above have

94. It does not appear that Alabama’s recently enacted near-ban on abortion amends
the procedure applicable to minors seeking abortions, though its existence dramatically
changes the landscape for those young women. See H.B. 314 § 4 (Ala. 2019) (criminalizing
abortion except where “necessary in order to prevent a serious health risk to the unborn
child’s mother”).
95. See Reprod. Health Servs. v. Marshall, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1284 (M.D. Ala. 2017)
(observing that Alabama’s framework is matched by “no other state”).
96. ALA. CODE § 26-21-4(i) (2014).
97. Id. § 26-21-4(j).
98. Id. § 26-21-4(c), (o).
99. Id. §26-21-4(l).
100. Id. § 26-21-4(k).
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been permanently enjoined by a district court101—that framework
comes closest to putting state court judges in an ordinary judicial
capacity resolving adversarial disputes. It therefore serves to
illustrate how different the judge’s role in this arena is in every
other state.
C. Attorney Admission and Discipline
The entrance to many professions—some argue too many102—
is regulated by state law. People wishing to engage in those
occupations must receive licenses from the state to do so. For all but
one of those professions, the licensing entity is an administrative
agency of the state government. In New York, for example, the
Division of Licensing Services of the Department of State boasts on
its website that it regulates “35 occupations throughout the state”
and “licenses over 800,000 individuals and businesses.”103 These
occupations range from cosmetology to home inspection, barbering
to hearing aid dispensing, pet cremation to coin processing, and
waxing to ticket reselling.104 Other professions in New York—like
doctors and dentists—are regulated by their own state
administrative agencies.105 The same is true across the country,
whether the subject is the practice of dentistry regulated by the
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners,106 one of the over
forty professions regulated by the Texas Department of Licensing

101. See Reprod. Health Servs. v. Marshall, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1296–97 (M.D. Ala.
2017). The court did not, however, reach the plaintiffs’ argument that any adversarial
procedure would necessarily be unconstitutional. Id. at 1286 n.19, 1295 n.24. But see Zbaraz
v. Hartigan, 776 F. Supp. 375, 382–84 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (concluding that the Court in Bellotti II
“did not contemplate that [a bypass] procedure would be . . . adversarial” and enjoining a
rule that would have allowed “[a]ny respondent that desires to do so” to file a response to
the minor’s petition).
102. See, e.g., Economic Liberty, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/pillar/economicliberty/?post_type=case (last visited Sept. 10, 2020) (cataloging litigation aimed at reducing
government regulation of occupations).
103. Department of State, Division of Licensing Services, N.Y. STATE,
https://www.dos.ny.gov/licensing/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2020).
104. Id.
105. See Office of Professional Medical Conduct, N.Y. STATE D EP’ T OF H EALTH,
https://www.health.ny.gov/professionals/doctors/conduct/ (last visited Sept. 10,
2020) (regulating doctors); Office of the Professions, N.Y. STATE E DUC. DEP’ T,
http://www.op.nysed.gov/prof/dent/dentlic.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2020)
(regulating dentists).
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-22(b) (1981).
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and Regulation,107 one of the fields of medicine regulated by the
Florida Department of Health’s Board of Medicine,108 or one of the
many hair, skin, and nail beautification occupations regulated by
the Iowa Board of Cosmetology Arts & Sciences.109
The exception is attorneys. In every state, the admission and
discipline of attorneys is governed, not by some Department of
Attorney Licensing, but by the state courts.110 In some states, this
responsibility and this power are allocated to the state courts in the
constitution;111 in others, by statute;112 and in others by judicial
decision.113 No matter the basis, the rationales have been the
same.114 First and foremost, lawyers are “officers” of the court. And
whether this entails something akin to a principal-agent frame in
which the court’s need to control its “officers” means that it must be
the entity which regulates admission into the practice,115 or whether
it means that considerations of efficiency or expertise suggest the

107. Programs Licensed and Regulated by TDLR, TEX. DEP’T OF LICENSING & REGUL.,
https://www.tdlr.texas.gov/licenses.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2020).
108. Licensing and Registration, FLA. BD. OF MED., https://flboardofmedicine.gov
/licensing/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2020) (regulating medical professions).
109. Board of Cosmetology Arts & Sciences, IOWA DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH,
https://idph.iowa.gov/Licensure/Iowa-Board-of-Cosmetology-Arts-and-Sciences
(last visited Sept. 10, 2020); see also IOWA CODE § 157.1(5), (6) (2015) (listing covered practices).
110. See Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United
States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 933 (1994); Michael C. Dorf, Disbarment in the United States:
Who Shall Do the Noisome Work?, 12 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 8 (1975). The regulation of
attorney admission by state court judges received recent and sustained public attention—
and, in many corners, criticism—as these judges were frequently the officials to make
decisions about the administration of the bar exam for aspiring attorneys amidst the COVID19 pandemic. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
111. E.g., N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2 cl. 3; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15; UTAH CONST. art. VIII,
§ 4; ARK. CONST. amend. 28.
112. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, § 13 (1939); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 82.021 (1987); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 36-2-1 (1941); D.C. CODE § 11-2501 (1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.910 (2020).
113. E.g., State v. Cook, 525 P.2d 761, 763–64 (Wash. 1974).
114. In the earliest days of the United States, the practice of law was inconsistently if
ever regulated. See Dorf, supra note 110, at 6; Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the
Courts to Regulate the Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525, 531–32 (1983).
But by the late-1800s, state courts began to regulate it. See Dorf, supra note 110, at 6–8.
115. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378–79 (1866); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824); People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928)
(Cardozo, C.J.); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 133 P.2d 325, 330 (Utah 1943); see also Hershkoff,
supra note 27, at 1873–74 (discussing state courts which claim the regulation of the bar to be
“an inherent aspect of their institutional role”).
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court ought to be that entity which does so,116 courts have long since
reached the conclusion that they have the “exclusive[]” power to
admit and discipline attorneys.117 Second, the courts’ power to
license lawyers is often justified by the claim that only the courts
can adequately preserve the independence of lawyers and the legal
profession from undue regulation or pressure from the more
political branches of government, particularly the legislature.118
Indeed, the American Bar Association even suggests that the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution all but requires that courts be
the entities to license lawyers.119
Of course, these claims are contestable. For one thing, at the
same time as the courts were articulating this vision of their
inherent power to govern admission to the bar, much of the practice
of law was moving “out of the courtroom and into the law office.”120
The claim that attorneys are notionally officers of the court is thus
a thin reed on which to rest such a sweeping argument when one
considers that many lawyers will never interact with a judge in
their entire careers. But they are all but guaranteed to interact with
clients, and critics charge that courts are not necessarily best
situated to regulate in the interests of those clients.121 Rather, they
say, it is the coordinate branches of government—contrary to the
116. See, e.g., Karlin, 162 N.E. at 493 (“[If] the house is to be cleaned, it is for those who
occupy and govern it, rather than for strangers, to do the noisome work.”); In re Integration
of Neb. State Bar Ass’n, 275 N.W. 265, 268 (Neb. 1937) (“The practice of law is so intimately
connected and bound up with the exercise of judicial power and the administration of justice
that the right to define and regulate its practice naturally and logically belongs in the judicial
department of our state government.”).
117. Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1857). Of course, as noted above, this
statement and its claim to historical practice were questionable in 1857. See supra note 114;
Alpert, supra note 114, at 535 (observing that this statement in Secombe about “well-settled
judicial power” is “misleading history”).
118. See Lawyer Regulation for a New Century, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/report_arc
hive/mckay_report/ (“From the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 to the McCarthy era of the
1950s, history has shown that the people’s respect for individual rights can sink dangerously
low. Legislatures act accordingly. During such times, an independent judiciary and legal
profession are necessary to protect those rights.”).
119. Id. (invoking the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as “another reason
why the judiciary must regulate the legal profession”).
120. Alpert, supra note 114, at 546; see also id. at 543 (discussing efforts by state
legislatures to recapture authority over the bar).
121. See id. at 548 (observing that critics “regard the interests of the client, who is the
consumer of legal services, as paramount to those of the professional” and noting that such
critics “did not trust lawyers to clean their own house”).
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ABA’s drumbeat—that are best situated to protect people from
predatory or unscrupulous lawyers. In other words, perhaps the
bar could stand to have its independence threatened a bit.122
But even setting that aside for the moment, none of the courts’
or the ABA’s arguments suggest that the nature of licensing and
discipline is—just as with any other licensed profession—anything
other than fundamentally administrative in nature. Indeed, it is
precisely because these tasks are qualitatively administrative that it
is even plausible to explore or suggest reallocating them away from
the state courts and into the same sorts of entities that regulate other
professions. That is, no one would suggest—perhaps least of all the
ABA—that the Iowa Board of Cosmetology Arts & Sciences serves
a traditionally judicial function when it decides whether to grant an
applicant a license to style hair.123 The courts’ insistence that the
practice of law is special does not make it so.
To be sure, the practice of law might be special. The courts
might be right that it makes sense to assign the role of attorney
regulation to those courts. But that conclusion cannot rest on vague
appeals to lawyers’ status as officers of the court or on the asserted
need for independence—which the argument suggests no other
profession deserves. Rather, it must rest on an analysis of the
interests at stake, the processes owed to protect those interests, and
the institutions best equipped to offer those processes. As with the
other quasi-administrative tasks explored in this Part, the final Part
takes up that charge.
II. THE STATE JUDGE AS ENFORCER
State court judges play another executive role distinct from the
quasi-administrative functions discussed in Part I. They exercise
enforcement discretion in precisely the area which the popular
conception perhaps most associates with the executive: the choice
whether to prosecute an individual. Specifically, a number of states
afford their judges the power to dismiss charges on the judge’s own
initiative and based on the judge’s own belief that it was a mistake
122. See id. at 554–56 (discussing arguments in favor of transferring the power over the
legal profession to state legislatures, noting that legislatures might be helpfully “less
sympathetic toward the bar than are the courts,” and pointing out that questions of how best
to regulate lawyers “are political and should be viewed as such”).
123. See infra Section IV.C.3 (discussing and criticizing D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983)).

746

2.POLLACK_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

747

3/27/2021 1:44 AM

Courts Beyond Judging

for the prosecutor to have commenced those charges in the
first place.
In the common conception, prosecutors choose whether to file
charges, which charges to file, and what penalties to seek. State
court judges preside over the ensuing criminal trials (or accept
pleas in the vastly more common circumstance124) and sentence
convicted individuals. That is, common law criminal justice
systems like the ones throughout the United States familiarly place
the judge in the role of arbiter with respect to charges that are filed
by an actor independent of the court, namely the local district
attorney or state attorney general. And that actor performs a
qualitatively executive law enforcement function: she enforces the
criminal law.125 As Justice Scalia put it, the power to investigate and
prosecute “has always and everywhere—if conducted by
government at all—been conducted never by the legislature, never
by the courts, and always by the executive.”126 And the power to
refrain from prosecuting likewise “has long been regarded as the
special province of the Executive Branch.”127 On the same logic, the
power to terminate a prosecution once it has begun was also
historically the province of the prosecutor herself. Indeed, at
common law, it was only the prosecutor who could enter the writ
of nolle prosequi and voluntarily dismiss a prosecution.128
But in nineteen states, judges in the trial courts have the explicit
law enforcement power to unilaterally dismiss prosecutions on the
judge’s own initiative.129 The judges in these states are not

124. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (noting that 97% of federal
convictions and 94% of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas, and then concluding
that “plea bargaining . . . is the criminal justice system” (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992))).
125. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (“There is no real dispute that the
[investigative and prosecutorial] functions performed by the independent counsel are
‘executive’ in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that typically have been
undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch.”); id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Governmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially
executive function.”).
126. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
127. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
128. Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine R. Connors, Culture and Crime: Kargar and the
Existing Framework for a Cultural Defense, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 829, 846 (1999) (“Seen from an
historical point of view, then, the writ appears to have been lodged solely in the hands of
the prosecutor . . . .”).
129. Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 330 (2017).
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evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, but are instead making
normative judgments about whether a case ought to be pursued
even if there is ample evidence of guilt—and concluding that it
ought not be.130
In the majority of these states, the judge’s power is capaciously
framed as the power to dismiss prosecutions “in furtherance of
justice.”131 Nearly all of them leave this determination to the judge’s
open-ended discretion and permit the judge to make that
determination on her own motion; some even forbid the defendant
from invoking the judicial dismissal statute and asking the judge to
exercise her discretion in this manner.132 New York was the first
state to give judges this power,133 and it imposed some bounds on
the judge’s discretion by requiring her to consider ten specific
factors before concluding that a dismissal is warranted.134 The
states that followed, however, have opted not to do so. Instead, they
simply require the judge to place on the record her reasons,
whatever they are, for ordering the dismissal.135
A small minority of the states with judicial dismissal statutes
instead permit the judge to dismiss a prosecution if the judge
concludes that the defendant’s conduct was relatively unimportant
or “too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction.”136 This
can be the case with respect to any crime; even defendants accused
of serious crimes can see their charges dismissed by a state court
judge pursuant to this sort of statute.137 These “de minimis”
dismissal statutes, while shaped slightly differently, still mirror the
more open-ended dismissal statutes in the power they afford to

130. See People v. Rickert, 446 N.E.2d 419, 420 (N.Y. 1983) (noting that the purpose of
this power is, “even to the disregard of legal or factual merit, . . . ‘to allow the letter of the
law gracefully and charitably to succumb to the spirit of justice’”).
131. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.21 (West 2017); see also Roberts, supra note 129, at 332, 333
n.21 (collecting statutes).
132. Roberts, supra note 129, at 352 n.158.
133. Id. at 333–34.
134. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 170.40 (misdemeanors), 210.40 (felonies).
135. See Valena E. Beety, Judicial Dismissal in the Interest of Justice, 80 MO. L. REV. 629,
656 (2015).
136. HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-236(1)(b) (2019); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 12(1)(b)
(2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-11(b) (West 2020); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 312(a)(2) (2020);
see Roberts, supra note 129, at 334–35 (discussing same).
137. See State v. Zarrilli, 523 A.2d 284, 287 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (“The de
minimis statute applies to all prohibited conduct.”); Roberts, supra note 129, at 336.
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judges with respect to the management and continuation of charges
against defendants in their courtrooms.
Across all of these states, the allocation of this power to the state
judiciary reflects a conscious choice to vest judges with an
enforcement power typically wielded by executive officials.
Indeed, when New York adopted its judicial dismissal statute, it
was motivated to do so specifically in order to weaken the
prosecutor’s enforcement discretion and distribute it to the
courts.138 The New York legislature found it problematic that the
judge was “unable, no matter how unjust may be the continuance
of the indictment against the defendant, to relieve him from that
injustice, until the district attorney chooses to consent that it do
so.”139 Other states went on to frame the power as one that the
prosecutors and the judges would exercise in “parallel.”140 And
judges, for their parts, have gotten the message. As Anna Roberts
has explained, judges tend to justify their decisions to dismiss
prosecutions by reference to their conclusion that the prosecutor
made a “wrong” choice based on the defendant’s mitigating
circumstances, or that the prosecutor’s resources could have been
better used focusing on other defendants or other crimes, or that
the prosecutor has over-charged or otherwise been unduly harsh
towards a given individual.141 All of these necessarily entail
replacing the prosecutor’s enforcement discretion with the judge’s.142
This concern on the part of judges that other actors in the
criminal justice system (here, prosecutors) are doing their jobs
incorrectly—or, indeed, that the criminal justice system is
altogether broken—might well be a valid one, and the judges’
138. People v. Rickert, 446 N.E.2d 419, 423 (N.Y. 1983) (“[O]ne of the reforms effected
through the years in the procedure to dismiss accusatory instruments in the interest of justice
was to remove the power to do so from the offices of District Attorney and Attorney-General
and lodge it, instead, in the courts alone.”).
139. Roberts, supra note 129, at 334 (citing COMM’RS ON PRAC. & PLEADING, REPORT ON
THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 343 (1850),
https://ia800202.us.archive.org/13/items/codecriminalpro00pleagoog/codecriminalpro0
0pleagoog.pdf).
140. Id. at 335–36.
141. Id. at 340–44 (collecting cases).
142. See id. (noting that, while “[p]rosecutors can decline to charge” or can move to
dismiss charges, judges are frustrated by the culture in prosecutors’ offices that minimizes
the exercise of this power and so step in to exercise it themselves); id. at 366 (“One sees judges
dismissing cases in favor of a range of mechanisms that they find as suitable as—or more
suitable than—the criminal law to achieve the relevant priorities.” (emphasis added)).
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efforts to step into the breach might well be laudable from that
perspective.143 But that does not make it any less a step into an
executive law enforcement role, albeit one authorized and
encouraged by state law.144 The final Part of this Article evaluates
whether that step may be justifiable.
III. THE STATE JUDGE AS LEGISLATOR
This last descriptive Part highlights two of the quasi-legislative
functions of state court judges. By calling them quasi-legislative, I
mean to draw attention to the fact that, when carrying out these
roles, judges are making law and setting policy. Of course, judges
also “make law” in the context of common law decisionmaking, but
common law judging is nonetheless rooted in the resolution of
adversarial disputes.145 This Part is about arenas in which state
court judges set policy outside of resolving any adversarial dispute.
That is, the judges choose to articulate new law in these contexts in
the same way that legislators do so: because an event in the world
triggers some obligation to act (like the depletion of a budget at the
end of a budgeting cycle), or simply because they believe it to be
wise policy.146
First, this Part discusses the roles that state court judges play in
apportioning legislative districts in response to the decennial
census. Second, it explores the roles that state court judges play in
creating specialized criminal courts because they think such courts
are a good idea.
143. See id. at 341–44, 348–49.
144. Indeed, some judges see themselves as courageously “tak[ing] charge of the
prosecution.” People v. More, 12 P. 631, 632 (Cal. 1887); see Roberts, supra note 129, at 348–49
(collecting cases).
145. The same can be said to describe, depending on one’s jurisprudential priors,
judicial activity in constitutional cases. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1996) (contrasting textualism and originalism with
a “common law approach to constitutional interpretation”).
146. One more widely appreciated example of a way in which state court judges “act[]
not in their familiar capacity as adjudicators deciding cases” but instead in a “quasilegislative role” is the drafting and promulgation of rules of civil and criminal procedure.
Crespo, supra note 27, at 1380 (rules of criminal procedure); see Clopton, supra note 27 (rules
of civil procedure). But as noted above, see explanation and sources cited at supra note 27,
this is a role served by federal court judges as well, at least in some fashion. And a robust
normative debate surrounds that practice. See sources cited at supra note 26 for additional
support. What has been lacking, however, is a more systematic evaluation of the array of
similar functions explored in this Article.
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A. Redistricting
In roughly half the states, judges play important roles in
redistricting—both with respect to congressional districts and state
legislative districts—that operate wholly outside the context of
dispute resolution. To be sure, individuals or groups file lawsuits
from time to time to challenge a given map, and judges will
necessarily resolve that dispute by issuing a judgment holding that
a particular map does or does not run afoul of constitutional or
statutory provisions.147 But that is decidedly not the full extent of
the state judge’s role in redistricting. Rather, many states ask their
judges to draw the district lines themselves. And others might
begin moving in that direction if concerns about partisan
gerrymandering sufficiently move the public to reallocate the
districting power away from the legislatures that traditionally and
typically take the laboring oar.148
Meanwhile, not only is redistricting an activity wholly removed
from dispute resolution, but it is an activity that is qualitatively
legislative. First, the activity entails the making of law: district
maps are statutes,149 and they reflect policy choices about the
structure of political representation.150 Second, the Elections Clause
of the U.S. Constitution suggests as much by providing that “[t]he
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof.”151 Third, the Supreme Court has likewise characterized
redistricting as a “legislative function.”152 And when the Supreme
Court recently held that citizens can draw district lines by
referendum consistent with the terms of the Elections Clause, it

147. See, e.g., League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018).
148. Cf. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (holding that partisan
gerrymandering claims are not justiciable under the U.S. Constitution).
149. See, e.g., S.B. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016),
https://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015E1/Bills/Senate/PDF/S2v4.pdf.
150. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966) (observing that redistricting
“involves choices about the nature of representation”).
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
152. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Cmm’n., 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2668
(2015) (“[O]ur precedent teaches that redistricting is a legislative function . . . .”); see also id.
at 2687 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing that redistricting is a legislative function).
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explained that this was so because the citizens were thereby
engaged in a lawmaking function.153
And yet, state court judges perform, or at least participate in,
that function.154 In a number of states, members of the state’s
highest court—often but not only the Chief Justice—are part of the
process by which a map is created in the first instance. In Alaska
and Vermont, for example, state legislative districts are drawn by
an independent commission with at least one member chosen by
the state’s Chief Justice.155 In Illinois, Hawaii, Montana, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Washington, those districts are likewise drawn
by independent commissions, and while their members are not
regularly chosen by the state courts, the courts serve a tiebreaking
function: An even number of commissioners are chosen by other
(ostensibly partisan) officials, and if those commissioners cannot
agree on a tiebreaking (ostensibly nonpartisan) last member, the
state high court chooses that last member.156 But California, Maine,
Mississippi, New Jersey, and Washington all go even a step further:
state court judges themselves serve as backup mapmakers. That is,
if the legislature or independent commission cannot agree on
a map, the map is either drawn by a group of officials which
includes a judge or by a panel of judges entirely on their own.157
This means a court will create the district map even in the absence of
a party seeking a judgment. And like the legislature itself, it can do so
without many constraints beyond those required to respect
constitutional rights.158

153. Id. at 2667 (majority opinion) (“[R]edistricting ‘involves lawmaking in its essential
features and most important aspect.’” (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)); id.
at 2676 (referring to “lawmaking by initiative to direct a State’s method of apportioning
congressional districts”).
154. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (“[S]tate courts have a significant role
in redistricting.”).
155. See ALASKA CONST. art. VI § 8(b); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 1904(a) (2019).
In addition, Colorado’s Constitution provides that every map created by the state’s
independent redistricting commission is automatically submitted to the state’s Supreme
Court for review. COLO. CONST. art. V § 48(2).
156. See ILL. CONST. art. IV § 3(b); HAW. CONST. art. IV § 2; MONT. CONST. art. V § 14(2);
N.J. CONST. art. II §§ 2(1)(c), (3)(2); PA. CONST. art. II § 17(b); WASH. CONST. art. II § 43(2).
157. See CAL. CONST. art. XXI § 2(j); ME. CONST. art. IV pt. 1 § 3, pt. 2 § 2; MISS. CONST.
art. XIII § 254; N.J. CONST. art. II § 2(3); WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.100.
158. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2019) (discussing equal
protection limitations on districting).
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But even if one considers circumstances in which a party has
invoked the jurisdiction of the court in the dispute-resolution
context, some states instruct their courts to do more than issue a
judgment and leave its resolution to legislative actors. In six states,
the courts are required to create remedial redistricting maps on
their own upon finding that a map created by legislative actors is
unlawful. In Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, and Michigan, the
state high court either is permitted (in Arkansas and Michigan) or
required (in Florida, Iowa, and Louisiana) to create its own map in
that circumstance.159 In North Carolina, the same is true, although
that role is served by a special three-judge appellate court.160
B. Establishing Specialized Criminal Courts
While the redistricting function is arguably cabined, it is not the
only quasi-legislative function that state court judges serve.
Increasingly, and without the imprimatur or even guidance of state
law, state court judges have taken upon themselves the initiative to
establish specialized courts for particular offenses or particular
classes of defendants.
As many actors in the criminal justice system reexamine some
of the assumptions or theories of punishment at its core—whether
due to concerns about overcrowded jails, the incidence of
recidivism, racial and other biases, and much more—one
frequently suggested reform is the creation of specialized courts.161
One form of specialized court is the “problem-solving court”: a
diversion of defendants away from the ordinary criminal courts
and into a venue geared towards treatment, monitoring,
community service, and prevention rather than incarceration.162
These have appeared in a host of contexts: drug courts, domestic
violence courts, gun courts, truancy courts, homelessness courts,
and others.163 The through-line in these problem-solving courts is
159. See ARK. CONST. art. VIII § 5; FLA. CONST. art. III § 16(c)–(f); IOWA CONST. art. III
§ 36; LA. CONST. art. III § 6(B); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 3.72, 4.262(3) (2020).
160. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-267.1; 120-2.4(a) (2016).
161. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 13, at 1482; James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal
Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1541 (2003).
162. Collins, supra note 13, at 1483.
163. Id.; see Problem Solving Courts: Addressing a Spectrum of Issues, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG
CT. PROFS., https://www.ncsc.org/topics/alternative-dockets/problem-solving-courts/
home [https://perma.cc/RL2B-3A88].
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that they take a more active role in the rehabilitation of offenders
by bringing together judges, court staff, and subject-area
professionals to develop treatment plans, offer education
(about, say, gun safety), point the way towards supportive social
services, address underlying issues in the lives of those who come
before the court, and preserve peace and safety (as in the domestic
violence context, for example).164 So, to take the example of drug
courts, the idea is that treating a defendant’s drug addiction is more
likely than traditional incarceration to reduce his propensity for
recidivism and to therefore “solve” the defendant’s (and, in turn,
society’s) “problem.”165
A second and more recent trend in the world of specialized
courts is the creation of what Erin Collins has called “status
courts”—courts specialized, not along the lines of a particular class
of offense, but a particular class of offender.166 The most common
thus far are veterans courts and girls courts, both based on the idea
that the relevant populations are “‘niche’ groups with ‘unique’
needs the system does not, but should, address.”167 In fact, many of
these status courts are presided over by judges who are members
of the same status group and, the story goes, are therefore better
able to relate to and serve as mentors for the offenders who appear
in their specialized courts.168 Notably, and in contrast to the
problem-solving courts discussed above, advocates for status
courts typically do not ground their advocacy only on the claim that
such courts lead to better outcomes. Rather, they contend that

164. See Problem Solving Courts, supra note 163; Collaborative Courts, SUPERIOR CT. OF
CAL., COUNTY OF ORANGE, https://www.occourts.org/directory/collaborative-courts/
[https://perma.cc/ATF2-HLDU].
165. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1488–89.
166. See generally Collins, supra note 13 (studying status courts).
167. Id. at 1483–84; see also Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Court: A Proactive
Approach, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 357, 363 (2009); Hawaii Girls Court,
HAW. ST. JUDICIARY, https://www.girlscourthawaii.org/.
168. Collins, supra note 13, at 1484, 1498, 1522. As Judge Patrick Dugan, a veteran and
judge on the Philadelphia Municipal Veterans Court, put it, he can relate to the defendants
who appear before him because he has “been there, done that, walked in their boots.”
Ines Novacic, For Veterans in Legal Trouble, Special Courts Can Help, CBS NEWS (Nov. 10, 2014,
2:32 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/for-veterans-legal-trouble-special-courts-canhelp [https://perma.cc/PPY7-KCV5].
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creating such courts is “morally the right thing to do” for the sake
of the offender.169
This Article does not intend to explore whether or not
establishing these specialized courts is normatively desirable,170 but
rather focuses on who makes the decision to establish them. The
foregoing discussion—like so much of the academic and popular
literature on specialized courts—was framed in the passive voice
because there is in fact little in the way of a sustained or empirical
account of the process by which these courts come into being
or, critically, of who initiates that process. What evidence does
exist, however, points towards judges themselves as the creators
and decisionmakers.171
That judges are generally the driving force here is reflected
throughout the stories that are held up as emblematic of the best or
most inspirational of the system. The first drug court in the United
States was created in Dade County, Florida in 1989 “by
administrative order of the chief judge of Florida’s 11th Judicial
Circuit.”172 The availability of funding incentives followed the
judge’s lead, with the 1994 federal Crime Act authorizing the U.S.
Department of Justice to make grants to fund such courts
throughout the country.173 And state government efforts to
169. Ari Melber, For Vets, Rehab Rather than Prison, MSNBC (Jan. 29, 2014, 5:57 PM),
https://www.msnbc.com/the-cycle/vets-rehab-rather-prison-msna257666 [https://perma
.cc/U3NB-EC9Z] (quoting then-Attorney General Eric Holder); see Collins, supra note 13,
at 1509–10.
170. Collins, for her part, makes compelling arguments that the verdict is decidedly
mixed. Collins, supra note 13, at 1500–27.
171. See Sohil Shah, Authorization Required: Veterans Treatment Courts, the Need for
Democratic Legitimacy, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 67,
91–96 (2014) (noting that, in many states, “judges create these courts without legislative
authorization” and therefore “have almost unlimited power to establish” them and “to
determine their structures, rules, and procedures”); Leib, supra note 27, at 723 (discussing a
local judge who was so interested in setting up a drug court despite the objections of his local
legislature that, “[a]lthough he was unable to convince his locality to pay its drug council to
sit with his criminal docket, he was active in getting a nearby locality’s council to come help
his court”). More recently, some states have taken the step of authorizing judges to create
these courts and have prescribed “basic requirements and policies,” but even in those states,
it is often (though not always) the judges themselves who are empowered to make the
creation decisions. Shah, supra, at 69–70, 84–91.
172. Drug
Court’s
Holistic
Approach,
MIAMI
DADE
COUNTY
https://www.miamidrugcourt.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44
&Itemid=54 (last visited Oct. 7, 2020).
173. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 L. & POL’Y
125, 127 (2001).
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centralize and organize these ad hoc judge-driven creation
decisions followed the money (and, of course, the arguable success
of the drug courts themselves).174 Similarly, the first veterans court
in the United States was opened in 2008 by Robert Russell, a judge
on the City Court in Buffalo, New York.175 Judge Russell took that
step based on his belief that it was warranted. And while he drew
on guidelines that the U.S. Department of Justice had already
prepared for earlier generations of drug courts, that choice was
seemingly his to make, as were the “slight modifications” he
made.176 The same was true when Judge Jo Ann Ferdinand chose to
create New York City’s first veterans court after a particularly
moving interaction with a Vietnam veteran defendant in her
courtroom.177 Once again, federal attention and encouragement
followed the ad hoc efforts of these individual judges.178 And the
first girls court in the country was opened in 2004 in Oahu, Hawaii
by the judges on the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit in that
state.179 Those judges appear to have crafted the program and
procedures from scratch themselves.180
This is not to say that all are sanguine about the role judges play
here.181 A number of commentators and judges wish that
circumstances were different and that state legislatures and
executive branch officials would play a larger role in managing and
174. Id. at 126–27.
175. Collins, supra note 13, at 1492; Russell, supra note 167, at 357 n.†. City courts are
part of the New York State court system. See Courts Outside New York City, NYCOURTS.GOV
(Oct. 10, 2013), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/cts-outside-nyc-CITY.shtml.
176. Russell, supra note 167, at 364–65.
177. Kristen Meriwether, Veterans Treatment Courts Offer Hope, but Only in Three
Boroughs, GOTHAM GAZETTE, https://www.gothamgazette.com/index.%20php%20
government/5279-veterans-treatment-courts-offer-hope-but-only-in-three-boroughs
[https://perma.cc/DV8Q4M6F] (last visited Oct. 7, 2020).
178. See EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, STRENGTHENING OUR MILITARY FAMILIES:
MEETING AMERICA’S COMMITMENT 12 (2011), http://www.defense.gov/home/features/201
1/0111_initiative/strengthening-our-military_january_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/79K2U8JL] (announcing a commitment to provide federal support for further development of the
“Veterans Treatment Court concept”).
179. HAW. ST. JUDICIARY, supra note 167.
180. Id.
181. But see Janet DiFiore, The Excellence Initiative and the Rule of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1053, 1061 (2018) (lauding new opioid courts in New York as examples of “how state court
systems are laboratories of reform, with judges and court staff increasingly taking on
leadership roles” that “gain [them] credibility with the public and [with] partner branches of
government” and that “advance the rule of law”).
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reforming these aspects of the criminal justice system. But they feel
that “the courts have no choice but to step into the void.”182 ThenChief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Judith Kaye,
sounded a similar note in a 2000 roundtable conversation with
other judges and scholars, arguing that “[t]he political branches are
choosing to put more and more cases into the courts” and that
judges are “simply trying to do the best job that [they] can” to
“improve the system.”183
Some judges have expressed even greater consternation about
taking on the mantle of court-creation.184 Truman Morrison, a judge
on the District of Columbia Superior Court,185 has called it “terribly
odd that America is looking to the judicial branch to solve these
problems,” and he places the blame with the “abject failure of the
other branches of government.”186 Taking it a step further, Judge
Morrison has noted that he is “concerned about the power that
judges have” to create new courts and that he does not think that
judges should be free “to leave their traditional role and be
informed only by their own personal definition of what justice
is.”187 “When you try and channel the energies of social change into
the judicial branch,” he cautioned, “it’s not a good fit.”188
Judge Cindy Lederman of the Florida courts’ Judicial Division has
likewise observed that “the public is now coming to the courts and
asking for solutions to problems like crime, domestic violence,
and substance abuse,” and has cautioned that, if judges “accept
this challenge, we’re no longer the referee or the spectator.

182. Nolan, supra note 161, at 1541–42.
183. Greg Berman, “What is a Traditional Judge Anyway?” Problem Solving in the State
Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 78, 85 (2000).
184. Some commentators share this concern. See Shah, supra note 171, at 82 (arguing
that “[c]onstitutional issues arise when judges act in roles traditionally associated with the
executive or legislature” and observing that “problem-solving court judges have exceeded
their delegated authority in the past”).
185. The District of Columbia Superior Court is the general jurisdiction state-equivalent
trial court in the District. See Superior Court, D.C. CTS., https://www.dccourts.gov/superiorcourt (last visited Oct. 7, 2020).
186. Berman, supra note 183, at 80; see id. at 83 (quoting Professor Ellen Schall as saying
that “the system from which the problem-solving courts have emerged was a failure on
any count”).
187. Id. at 81.
188. Id. at 82.
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We’re a participant in the process [which is] quite a leap.
It’s not traditional.”189
Whether one approves or disapproves of the move, then, the
fact remains that the establishment of new courts to solve problems
that some perceive in the criminal justice system—as apt and
urgent as those perceptions might be—is not the ordinary job of a
judge. Indeed, it is the ordinary job of a legislature. The next and
final Part of this Article evaluates the propriety of state court judges
serving such a function.
IV. ASSESSING AND REFORMING THE ROLES OF THE STATE JUDICIARY
Given the breadth of the roles played by state court judges, and
also given the weight of those functions and the interests at stake
for the citizens who encounter state court judges in these capacities,
it is crucial not only to recognize these roles but to evaluate how
they ought to be conceived and treated.190 The mere fact that they
depart from the classic conception of the judge is, of course, not
itself a cause for concern.191 But on their merits, these roles might
raise significant concerns. This Part examines the interests
implicated in each of the roles discussed in this Article, evaluates
the degree to which the status quo respects those interests, and
explores whether and how those interests might be better served.
While there might be many different ways in which a process can
be said to respect or not respect the interests at stake, I follow a wellworn path in administrative law and institutional design
scholarship and focus here on the desirability and presence of
decisionmaker accountability, decisionmaker expertise, and
decisionmaker discretion—that is, how much we might want that
feature to exist with respect to each function, and how much it does
exist in the existing allocation of that function.192 Accountability
189. Id. at 80.
190. As noted at the outset, this Article does not claim to capture the full universe of
these roles. The examples described, however, shed light on how large that universe is and
motivate the normative analysis in this Part.
191. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225,
1307 (1999) (arguing that “[p]articular institutions serve complex functions in each
constitutional system” and that each should be assessed on its own terms).
192. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2255, 2331–38
(2001); see also Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 67 VAND. L. REV. 443, 481–82,
488–91, 496–501 (2014); Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the
Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1770–76 (2012); Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial
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speaks to whether the decisionmaker is or should be electorally or
politically responsive when making a particular decision; expertise
to whether the decisionmaker might require specific knowledge in
order to be good at making the decision; and discretion to the
amount of freedom to maneuver we might want the decisionmaker
to have to make individualized determinations and judgment calls.
This Part takes the three rough categories set out above in order
of increasing concern—starting with the executive law enforcement
role and moving first to the quasi-legislative and then to the quasiadministrative roles. This last category raises the most significant
problems, at least as currently structured, and therefore warrants
the most fulsome discussion about the paths for possible reform.
A. State Judges as Enforcers
The law enforcement role played by state court judges explored
in this Article is the judge’s power to terminate a prosecution sua
sponte by ordering its dismissal because the judge thinks the
prosecution unwise or unjust.193 To an observer schooled in the
more rigid separation of powers doctrine applicable at the federal
level under the U.S. Constitution, this allocation might seem odd,
at a minimum, and perhaps even inappropriate. But the relative
pliability of the separation of powers in the states allows for more
experimentation with alternative arrangements194—and, in turn,
demands a normative rather than doctrinal evaluation of
that arrangement.
Here, the threatened interests are primarily those of the
prosecution (and, in turn, the public on whose behalf she
purportedly acts).195 Because we are considering here not the judge
who rules on a defense motion to dismiss a prosecution but rather
the judge who makes that decision on her own motion, the party
whose authority is most potentially inappropriately displaced by
the judge’s decision is the prosecutor who is deprived of the
Deference, and Administrative Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029,
2059 (2011); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 469–91 (2003).
193. See supra Part II.
194. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
195. For a more nuanced understanding of where the interests of the public truly fall
in criminal prosecutions, see Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “the People” in Criminal Procedure,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (2019).
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opportunity to prosecute the case. Put another way, the judge’s
choice not to dismiss a prosecution leaves both prosecution and
defense in exactly the same position they were in before the judge
made her choice not to act: the prosecution can continue with its
case, the defense can move for dismissal, both parties can engage
in plea bargaining, and so on. But the judge’s choice to dismiss a
prosecution benefits the defendant and displaces the prosecutor. It
is in this specific sense that I speak of the prosecution’s interests in
advancing a case being those primarily at stake in this context.
With that in mind, we can proceed to evaluate whether the
prosecution’s interests are adequately protected. There are a few
ways in which they might not be. The first has to do with the
allocation of discretion. Here, an entity entirely outside of the
prosecutor’s chain of authority—wholly unaccountable to the
District Attorney or the state’s Attorney General—has the power to
reverse a decision made by and otherwise entrusted to the
prosecutor. Of course, judges routinely reverse decisions made by
executive officials, but when they do so, it is because the adversarial
process has revealed the executive’s decision to have been
unlawful.196 It is another thing entirely for the judge to substitute
her choice of wise executive action for the executive’s discretionary
choice—to replace the prosecutor’s discretion with her own. And,
as discussed above, that is precisely what at least some judges seem
to think they are doing when they exert this particular sort of
enforcement authority.197 If the prosecutor’s interests are
legitimately worth protecting—and more on that below—it would
be fair to worry that the judge’s discretionary authority is
problematic because it threatens those interests.
Second, insofar as one thinks that prosecutorial discretion is
generally a wise allocation of power which reflects a prosecutor’s
superior expertise with respect to the full range of crimes being
committed in a jurisdiction and the charging choices made across
the board, it might be worrisome for a judge—who most likely sees
only a slice of the cases the prosecutor charges and who necessarily
sees none of the cases the prosecutor does not charge—to be able to

196. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (providing that federal judges shall “hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” of law that are, among other things,
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
197. See supra notes 142 & 144 and accompanying text.
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displace the prosecutor’s more expert decision with her own less
expert one.
Third, the prosecution might reasonably worry that the general
public, to which prosecutors are ultimately accountable (by
election, by perceived mission, or both), would place the blame on
the prosecutor for “dropping” otherwise publicly desired charges
when it was in fact the judge who did so through a comparatively
more obscure provision of state law. This potential scrambling of
responsibility in the eyes of the public is a perennial concern
whenever one entity has the power to displace the decision of
another entity; the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth
Amendment, for example, is premised in part on the concern that a
local official will be blamed by her constituents for what was in
reality a decision forced on her by federal law.198 As the Supreme
Court has put it, “Accountability is thus diminished when, due to
federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in
accordance with the views of the local electorate . . . .”199 By the
same token, one might argue that prosecutorial accountability is
diminished when, due to a judge’s exercise of this enforcement
power, the prosecutor cannot prosecute in accordance with the
views of the local electorate.
On the other hand, it is not the case that prosecutors are entirely
without recourse. On the public accountability front, for example,
elected district attorneys or attorneys general who worry about
being unfairly punished by voters have strong incentives to defend
their records and to deploy campaign resources to shift the blame
back to the meddlesome judge. The dissenters in one of the
Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering cases made the same point,
and further argued that the idea that voters will be confused about
whom to blame “reflects a gross lack of confidence in the electorate
that is at war with the basic assumptions underlying any
democratic government.”200
But there nonetheless remain legitimate objections rooted in
expertise and discretion: the idea that prosecutors are better
198. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997) (noting, in the context of a
federal law requiring state and local law enforcement to conduct background checks on
handgun purchasers, that “it will likely be the [local official], not some federal official, who
will be blamed for any error . . . that causes a purchaser to be mistakenly rejected”).
199. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992).
200. Printz, 521 U.S. at 957 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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situated than judges to make inherently discretionary charging
decisions. For that reason, and in light of the fact that the judge is
already taking on a function not ordinarily associated with dispute
resolution, it seems appropriate to ensure that the judge exercises
this function with care and in limited circumstances. As discussed
in Part II, New York takes important steps in the right direction by
bounding the judge’s power and requiring her to consider ten
specific factors before concluding that a dismissal is warranted.201
The other states that do not impose such limits might do well to
consider them. The fact that many of those states require the judge
to articulate on the record her reasons for ordering the dismissal is
an important feature, given that it is widely understood that
reason-giving requirements tend of their own accord to improve
the quality of discretionary decisionmaking.202 But explicitly
indicating what those reasons ought to be would represent an
improvement.203 Finally, it could be worth considering whether to
explicitly afford prosecutors an avenue to appeal a judge’s
dismissal decision if the prosecution feels strongly that it was an
error or a poor discretionary judgment.
Of course, one might also feel that prosecutors already have too
much power in the criminal justice system (or further still, that they
exercise that power poorly). If you feel that way, then your heart
probably does not go out to the prosecutor who has her judgment
displaced by the judge and your hackles are likely not raised by the
accountability, expertise, and discretion-based analysis offered
above. That is not unreasonable; among the problems raised by the
many-hatted state court judge, this is hardly the gravest. But even
so, the reforms just outlined could result in a more coherent system
that better reflects the interests of all of the participants.

201. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—at OIRA and Beyond,
103 GEO. L.J. 259, 303 (2015); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking HealthBased Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1233 (2014); Frederick Schauer, Giving
Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 657–58 (1995); Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American
Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1813 (2012);
Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1280–82 (2009).
203. Indeed, one might say that New York’s approach not only mitigates the problem
but neutralizes it by placing the judge in a somewhat more classically “judicial” role. That is,
it asks the judge to apply legislatively mandated criteria to evaluate executive action in a
way that is closer to typical administrative law practice.
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B. State Judges as Legislators
This Article described two of the unique quasi-legislative roles
that state judges serve: redistricting and establishing specialized
criminal courts. As a categorical matter, these operate at the level
of broad policymaking rather than individualized determinations.
So, the discretion question is not implicated here in the same way
that it is in the other two contexts. But the freedom to act based
largely on the decisionmaker’s sense of good policy only raises the
stakes of the accountability and expertise questions. And on that
score, the judges’ role in establishing specialized criminal courts
raises more serious concerns than their role in redistricting.
1. Redistricting
When it comes to redistricting—where judges participate in the
process in a number of ways including serving as tiebreaking or
backup mapmakers204—the interests at stake are both dramatic and
of a few different types. First, there is the interest of the voters to
“band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who
espouse their political views.”205 The drawing of district lines can
either facilitate that interest by preserving coherent communities of
interest or interfere with that interest by splitting such
communities.206 Whether one understands this interest as finding
voice in the First Amendment,207 in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments,208 or elsewhere, the important point for present
purposes is that the power to draw district lines implicates interests
of constitutional moment for voters. Second, there is the related
interest of each voter in being treated equally vis-à-vis other voters
204. See supra Section III.A.
205. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Cal.
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000)); see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.
Ct. 2484, 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (referring to “the most fundamental of [citizens’]
constitutional rights: the rights to participate equally in the political process, to join with
others to advance political beliefs, and to choose their political representatives”).
206. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153 (1993) (“Dividing [a] minority group
among various districts so that it is a majority in none may prevent the group from electing
its candidate of choice.”).
207. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1938 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring).
208. See, e.g., Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 152–53 (applying the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
which was enacted “to help effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment’s guarantee”); Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that political gerrymandering
claims are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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by the line-drawer.209 Third, both of these personal interests are
matched by broader societal interests in a functioning democracy
in which all of the voters have faith in the system.210 And in turn,
because the drawing of district lines determines the people to
whom a particular elected official is responsible, the power to draw
those lines carries with it the power to shape or distort channels of
accountability, or even to direct that accountability away from the
electorate and to the line-drawer himself instead.211 A distorted
electorate is, as the Supreme Court has put it, “altogether
antithetical to our system of representative democracy,”212 so it
ought to be beyond much dispute that the redistricting power
implicates voters’ fundamental interests in a functional democratic
form of government.
We must turn, then, to consider whether these interests are
well-protected when state court judges are charged with drawing
these district lines—either in absolute terms or relative to when
legislatures do it. As discussed above, this function has long been
understood as a “legislative function,”213 with the implicit ideal
being that the line-drawers themselves would be electorally
accountable. This, after all, is the argument that is often made by
opponents of independent redistricting commissions: we ought not
want an “unelected, unaccountable institution” to “permanently
and totally displace[]” the legislature—and through them, the

209. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (“Classifications of citizens solely on the
basis of race ‘are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality.’” (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100
(1943))); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the
opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators.”).
210. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2511–12 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(discussing districting’s impact on democracy).
211. Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he partisan gerrymanders here debased and
dishonored our democracy, turning upside-down the core American idea that all
governmental power derives from the people. These gerrymanders enabled politicians to
entrench themselves in office as against voters’ preferences.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648; see Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Even as a majority of the Court recently found partisan gerrymandering claims
to be nonjusticiable, it conceded that “[e]xcessive partisanship in districting leads to results
that reasonably seem unjust” and that “such gerrymandering is ‘incompatible with
democratic principles.’” Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz.
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)).
213. See supra note 183 and accompanying text; Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2668.
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voters—from the redistricting process.214 Precisely because so much
is at stake, there could be real danger in allowing an unaccountable
entity to exercise that much power. On this theory, the fact that state
court judges might be thought to be less electorally accountable
than the legislators themselves makes it problematic to shift this
role to those judges.
The problem with this theory is that, as just discussed,
experience has revealed that the supposedly accountable
legislature can use its power to draw district lines in ways that
minimize that very accountability. It therefore becomes difficult to
argue that the legislature is the best home for this task when the
legislators instead use their power to insulate themselves from the
voters. Of course, one could still believe that legislators are the
wrong people to trust to draw their own district lines and also
believe that the officials doing so ought to be electorally
accountable. But it must be emphasized that many state court
judges are in fact elected.215 In contrast to appointed federal judges,
then, state court judges straddle the line between accountable and
unaccountable. Sometimes this fact raises serious concerns about
the judge’s discretion when it comes to dispute resolution or some
of the quasi-administrative functions further evaluated below,216
but in this particular arena, this accountability helps justify the
judge’s quasi-legislative role and helps temper concerns about
what otherwise might look like too much power vested in too
secure an official.217 Moreover, recall that, at least for now, in no
state are the judges alone the first-choice line-drawer. Rather, they
always serve either in a backup or tiebreaking capacity—to take

214. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2691 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
215. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An
Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 71
(2011) (noting that “89% of all state court judges face the voters in some type of election”).
216. E.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 696–97 (1995) (“[T]o the extent majoritarian pressures influence
judicial decisions because of judges’ electoral calculations, elective judiciaries seem, at least
at first glance, irreconcilable with one of the fundamental principles underlying
constitutionalism.”); infra notes 243, 287 and accompanying text. See generally JED
HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN
AMERICA (2012).
217. By the same token, this particular feature of state court judging might help justify
the fact that those judges are so often elected.
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charge once the legislature has failed to do its job—or in a
commission capacity along with other accountable officials.218
Finally, the concern that judges might lack subject-matter
expertise (say, on population statistics and mapmaking) is not as
important here as it is in other contexts discussed in this Article
because, while redistricting can be technical, the judges—just like
the legislatures—can and do employ the services of technical
experts.219 Armed with that assistance, the judges are likely just as
capable as any decisionmaker of making smart choices. Indeed,
they might be more expert than legislators when it comes to the
limits on redistricting discretion imposed by constitutional and
statutory law.
In sum, notwithstanding the fact that the role calls upon them
to do something beyond traditional dispute resolution, state court
judges are fairly well-situated to participate in the redistricting
process in the ways in which they currently do. By virtue of their
blend of electoral accountability and separation from the
legislature, judges can manage and adequately serve the important
individual and systemic interests at stake. And given the
rampant—and now unchecked by federal courts220—practice of
partisan gerrymandering by state legislatures, more citizens in
more states might well conclude that state court judges ought to
play this role.
2. Establishing specialized criminal courts
Once we turn to the judges’ establishment of specialized courts,
however, the practice is harder to defend. There are a number of
decisions that these judges are making—whether to have
specialized courts, which ones to establish, what procedures to
adopt, and what remedial schemes to offer all come to mind—and,
in all of them, the interests at stake are not only important, but
numerous and pointing in (at least potentially) different directions.
There are, of course, the interests of the accused individuals.
218. See supra Section III.A.
219. See League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 181 A.3d 1083, 1085–86 (Pa. 2018)
(noting appointment of Professor Nathaniel Persily “as advisor to assist the Court in
adopting, if necessary, a remedial congressional redistricting plan”).
220. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (holding that
“partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal
courts”).
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Remember that the most notable of these courts have thus far been
created for veterans, girls, and individuals struggling with drug
addiction, so the accused individuals’ interests would center on
seeing structures that offer a fair hearing that respects their
arguably unique needs, affords just resolutions, and results in
appropriate punishment that provides for meaningful
opportunities for rehabilitation.221 There are also the interests of the
prosecutors in having a system that facilitates prosecuting and
sentencing offenders in ways the prosecutors find appropriate. Of
course, many prosecutors might ultimately agree with a defendant
about what a proper process and result looks like; my point is
simply that they have their own conception and their own stake in
seeing it come to fruition. There are also the interests of victims—
where the offenses in question are not victimless—in having their
needs met and in seeing their vision of justice implemented. And
there are the concentric circles of impact which ripple out from any
given prosecution: the families of the defendants, the immediate
community, and the broader public. All of them have a stake in
how the criminal justice system is operated and in the outcomes
it produces.
With all of that on the table, the question is whether these
diverse and weighty interests are appropriately served when state
court judges decide whether to create new status and specialty
courts and how to structure them. The strongest argument that they
are so served is twofold. First, state court judges have expertise in
the functioning of the criminal justice system. They see it every day
(or at least the ones engaged in this enterprise do) and are
positioned to see it from a somewhat neutral position, at least as
compared to prosecutors and defense attorneys, defendants, and
victims.222 They also are better acquainted with the system’s
realities than are legislators, who operate at something of a remove
and would need to be educated—by the judges themselves, as well
221. Collins, supra note 13, at 1483–84; see supra Section III.B.
222. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in
Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2052 (2016) (“[S]ystemic facts [about the criminal
legal system] frequently reside within the considerable amounts of information already
within criminal courts’ custody and control.” (emphasis removed)). Crespo’s focus is on
constitutional criminal law, see id. at 2050 & n. 1, rather than the sort of legislating about the
criminal legal system discussed here. But his call for judges to empower themselves by their
expertise and to regulate that process has resonance with arguments that judges
appropriately act similarly in this quasi-legislative arena.
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as by others—in order to approach the level of experience that the
judges already have. Second, one could argue that it would be good
for experts to construct the “best” criminal justice system and that,
in order to do so, those experts would need to feel safe to buck
public opinion and would therefore need to be insulated from
electoral recrimination and accountability. The judge is often held
out as such an actor.
The first argument from expertise is a plausible one. But the
second argument about the virtue of judges’ unaccountability fails
here for a few reasons. First, as discussed above, many state court
judges are elected and so, even taking the argument at face value,
these judges would not fit the bill. But more deeply, the various
interests at stake here point in so many different directions and are
not capable of resolution by reference to some Platonic ideal of a
criminal justice system. Far from it, they must be reconciled, traded
against one another, and hammered into compromise. Expertise
about the inputs cannot do that; only a mandate to make policy by
balancing the diverse needs and preferences of the people can. And
for that reason, establishing and structuring these courts needs to be
done by a democratically accountable actor with the capacity to
hear those views, strike those balances, and back them up with the
institutional credibility that makes even dissatisfied constituents
accept the bargain.223
So, why not the elected judges? They have the expertise and the
formal structural accountability, but what they lack is the capacity
for public debate, for airing the issues and various perspectives,
and for offering solutions that are uniform rather than ad hoc. And
so long as judges are the main movers on this quasi-legislative
issue, this will not change because judges are just not equipped to
hold the sort of hearings and debates that legislators do when they
make policy. They are not well-situated to absorb in a rigorous way
policy recommendations from individuals and groups arrayed
across all facets of the issue. They are also often personally invested

223. Cf. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME
& JUST. 283, 283, 300 (2003) (“Legal authorities gain when they receive deference and
cooperation from the public,” and such deference and cooperation are more forthcoming
when the public has the ability to “state [its] views to an authority and to feel that those
views are being considered.”).
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in perpetuating a particular model of a specialized court.224 This is
particularly problematic given that, as the examples discussed
above tend to illustrate, far too much turns on a particular judge’s
personal experience or personal feelings. And finally, any one
judge’s ability to offer a solution extends only to her own
courtroom and as far as her power to persuade other judges to do
similarly.225 By contrast, a state’s legislature is better-situated to
assimilate all of the perspectives that animate the public’s interests
and to produce from them uniform, statewide policies.
Many of the judges who have established these specialized
courts seem to concede as much and to see themselves as filling a
second-best role.226 That is, they perceive an urgent need that the
legislature is not meeting and so have thrust themselves into the
breach. So this Article does not aim to criticize these judges for what
they have done, but rather to argue that they are poorly situated to
do it well and that state legislatures need to take on a greater role.227
At a minimum, they ought to make express delegations to these
judges coupled with some degree of overarching policy guidance:
What are the goals of a specialized criminal justice system? What
values should judges take into account? Which of the various
interests at stake are to be centered and which are meant to yield?
If the legislature were to answer these bigger questions, then judges
engaged in court-creation could at least shift to implementing
policy rather than creating it in the first instance, catch as catch can.
Better still, the legislature could learn from the judges’ expertise—
and learn from the defense bar, the prosecution, victims’ rights
organizations, psychologists, criminologists, doctors, community
leaders, and more—and actually make these decisions itself.228
224. See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., LEGAL ACCENTS, LEGAL BORROWING: THE INTERNATIONAL
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT MOVEMENT 137–39 (2009) (describing judges as “true believers”
and “proselytizers” for the cause of specialized courts).
225. See supra Section III.B.
226. See supra notes 182–183, 186 and accompanying text.
227. See Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 27, at 133 (similarly arguing that the courts’
role here “is less a long-term solution than a short-term mitigation, which masks yet does
not solve” broader societal problems like “an insufficient social safety net in the face of
growing inequality” that a legislature is better situated to address).
228. New York City recently established a pilot program in Brooklyn to create a
specialized “gun court.” This court is a joint effort of the Mayor, the Commissioner of the
NYPD, the City’s District Attorneys, the state Attorney General, the state court system’s
Chief Administrative Judge, the city’s Citizens Crime Commission, and others. See Mayor de
Blasio and State Courts Announce “Project Fast Track” to Ensure Shooters Are Quickly Apprehended
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***
The prior subpart’s evaluation of the state court judge’s law
enforcement role offered some qualified support for the practice.
But it argued that the judge’s power to second-guess the
prosecutor’s discretionary choices ought to be cabined in order to
better account for the fact that prosecutors are better situated than
judges to make inherently discretionary charging decisions that call
upon a wider-angle lens than the judge’s docket might afford her.
Here, by contrast, the challenge to the judge’s quasi-legislative roles
comes primarily from the accountability angle because these quasilegislative roles implicate a wider array of interests. Indeed, almost
by definition, making the law involves balancing and assimilating
a number of competing goals and views. It is therefore important
that the institutions that set policy be broadly and electorally
accountable and be positioned to take uniform and consistent
action. That sounds more like a legislature and less like a judge.
But state legislatures have their own limitations. This is
particularly true in the redistricting context. And the fact that state
court judges are often themselves elected means they may not be as
inappropriate a substitute as they might otherwise seem. So, where
the legislature is particularly ill-equipped by virtue of its own
dynamics to perform a particular legislative task—like
redistricting—the state court judge can be an eminently justifiable
understudy. But where the legislature is not necessarily so
limited—like with respect to setting the structure of the criminal
courts—the judge’s role is substantially harder to justify.229
and Remain Off the Streets, N.Y.C. (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-themayor/news/044-16/mayor-de-blasio-state-courts-project-fast-track-ensure-shootersquickly#/0. While true legislative initiation would be ideal, for the reasons discussed above,
the fact that this program did not emerge just from the judges themselves and is integrated
into a broader project with politically accountable actors drawing on wide-ranging
experience and expertise is a step in the right direction.
229. This conclusion calls into some question the legitimacy of what Andrew Crespo
describes as the often unaccountable role, which he heralds for its potential in the criminal
law context, that state court judges play or could play in making rules of procedure.
See Crespo, supra note 26, at 1383–84, 1387 (observing that state courts are “empowered—
quite unlike their federal counterparts—with authority to repeal or override legislatively
enacted statutes simply by promulgating a countervailing rule of procedure,” and offering
that this means “[state court judges] are heroes on the horizon” who can use this power to
“regulate prosecutorial power”). To be sure, Crespo recognizes that judges might exercise
this power to enable prosecutorial pathologies rather than tame them, see id. at 1388, but that
question mark is precisely what makes it so dangerous to allocate that legislative role to a
relatively less accountable institution like the state judiciary.
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C. State Judges as Administrators
The last of the hats that state judges wear is their administrative
one. This Article explored three of the quasi-administrative
functions over which state judges are assigned authority: name
change applications, access to abortion, and attorney admission
and discipline.230 This Section takes these in turn and demonstrates
that each raises significant concerns, at least as currently structured.
1. Name change applications
Take the name change applications first. These implicate
significant personal interests for the applicants. It might be easy to
wave these away as flights of fancy for those seeking bizarre
monikers for shock value, but the reality is often otherwise. These
applicants are people who are trying to reconcile their identities
and lived experiences with their legal names.231 For example, until
recently, those in committed same-sex relationships who lived in
jurisdictions where the institution of marriage (and the simpler,
more automatic name change that can ensue) was prohibited to
them often sought to share a last name that would reflect the reality
of their commitment.232 Today, even though that particular
roadblock has been removed,233 trans and non-binary individuals
continue to seek new names and legal documents that reflect their
gender identities.234 And stepping outside the LGBT rights context,
230. See supra Part I.
231. See Emens, supra note 40, at 763 (“Names are a highly personal matter, arguably
constitutive of our selves.”).
232. See, e.g., In re Miller, 824 A.2d 1207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (reversing denial of name
change application made by person seeking to adopt her same-sex partner’s surname); In re
Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2002); In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001); see also Emens, supra note 40, at 790 (making similar observation).
233. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
234. See In re Powell, 95 A.D.3d 1631 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (reversing lower court
rejection of name change application made by transgender person); In re A.M.B., 997 A.2d
754 (Me. 2010) (vacating and remanding denial of transgender applicant’s petition); In re
McIntyre, 715 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1998) (reversing lower court decision denying petition for name
change); In re Eck, 584 A.2d 859 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (same); In re Ladrach, 513
N.E.2d 828, 829 (Ohio Prob. 1987) (noting prior granting of transgender applicant’s name
change petition); see also In re Bobrowich, No. 159/02, 2003 WL 230701, at *1 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
Jan. 6, 2003) (requiring “medical and psychiatric evidence” to “establish whether or not the
petitioner is a transvestite or a transsexual,” and if not, then “the court will require some
showing on the part of the [male] petitioner that [the requested name] is regarded as a male
name in this or some other culture”); J. Dylan Sandifer, A Day in Name-Changing Court, VOX
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similar identity-setting, identify-reflecting interests exist for
anyone seeking to legally change their name.235 Without going
quite so far as to suggest that the First Amendment is directly
implicated, it is not a stretch to see that one’s ability to change one’s
legal name finds voice in the same sorts of guarantees of free selfexpression that protect art, literature, protest, and so much more.236
Of course, everyone is free to “go by” any name they choose in their
daily lives without even informing the government about it, let
alone seeking permission.237 But even something as simple as
boarding a plane or opening a bank account is made simpler when
one’s legal name matches one’s chosen name, which is no doubt
why we have an official system in which names can be changed in
the first place.
The interests of the applicant are not the only interests at stake,
however. The broader public has an interest in ensuring that an
applicant is not changing his name in order to subvert the law—for
example, by escaping prosecution, evading a sex offender registry,
or dodging financial obligations. The public might also have an
interest in preventing the corrosion of national discourse through
the entry into the mainstream of names which might deeply offend,
although the degree to which the government can act to serve that
interest consistent with the First Amendment is questionable, to say
the least.238 These, however, are more or less the extent of the

(July 25, 2019), https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/7/16/20694731/how-tochange-your-name-legal-name.
235. See Emens, supra note 40, at 774 (noting that “the act of naming is often an act of
power” and that “[t]he ability to choose one’s own name is arguably therefore an important
aspect of self-possession”); Sandifer, supra note 234 (“We all named ourselves, and
demanded to be recognized.”).
236. See Julia Shear Kushner, Note, The Right to Control One’s Name, 57 UCLA L. REV.
313, 339 (2009) (“[N]ames have been used as a means of expression prior to their regulation
by the state.”); Laura A. Heymann, A Name I Call Myself: Creativity and Naming, 2 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 585, 594 (2012).
237. See supra note 42.
238. The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), and
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019), are instructive. The Court concluded in both cases
that prohibiting the registration of allegedly “disparag[ing]” and “immoral[] or scandalous”
trademarks violates the First Amendment because “[s]peech may not be banned on the
ground that it expresses ideas that offend.” Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751; Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at
2299–300.
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interests at stake beyond the applicant’s own interests.239 That is, it
is difficult to come up with any neutral reason beyond avoiding
enabling fugitives and avoiding substantial offense why anyone
should care what another adult chooses as his or her legal name.240
With the significant interests on the side of the applicant’s
self-expression, and the handful of interests arrayed against the
applicant, we have to ask whether all of those interests are properly
served and balanced by state court judges operating in the legal
regimes currently in place throughout the fifty states. The short
answer is that some of those regimes hit much closer to the mark
than others do. But before exploring why, it is important to first
examine who would be the best sort of decisionmaker along the
axes of accountability, expertise, and discretion. First, and in
contrast to the functions already discussed, there is little need for
electoral accountability here because the public’s interests are so
much weaker than those of the individual applicants.241 Indeed,
electoral accountability might in fact be undesirable because it could
distort the judge’s decisionmaking in pernicious ways.242 For
example, an electorally accountable decisionmaker might be more
inclined to rule against name changes that appear to denote a
change in gender in order to demonstrate his bona fides to an
electorate that might be hostile to LGBT rights (or, at a minimum,
to avoid alienating those constituents).243 Once the applicant’s
239. Perhaps the public might also have an interest in minimizing the administrative
cost of updating records, but that speaks more to a preference for limiting name change
rights in general rather than to resolving any particular application.
240. See In re Miller, 824 A.2d 1207, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (similarly arguing that a
denial of a name change in the absence of concerns like evasion of prosecution or financial
obligations “rob[s] the applicant of that which in no way enriches, or protects, the public and
makes the applicant poor indeed”).
241. Of course, if you think that electoral accountability is beneficial in this context, the
fact that so many state court judges are elected ought to satisfy that demand and make them
a well-situated decisionmaker.
242. See Miriam Seifter, Understanding State Agency Independence, 117 MICH. L. REV.
1537, 1589–90 (2019) (“The more one believes an agency’s decision needs to be based on
factors other than public preferences, the less one is appeased by institutional design that
favors majoritarianism.”).
243. See Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark & Jee-Kwang Park, Judicial Independence
and Retention Elections, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 211, 228 (2012) (“In an environment in which
judges are often obliged to defend their records on salient political issues and make policy
statements, retention elections (and their competitive complement, nonpartisan elections)
can create incentives for judges to cater to public opinion . . . .”); Leib, supra note 27, at 720
(quoting one local judge in New York as saying, “We are all political. It is silly to deny it
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interests are understood as touching on rights—which we generally
do not put up for a vote on a case-by-case basis—it should scan as
problematic to have the entity deciding whether a particular
person’s right should be respected or not be primarily accountable
to a broader public.244 An unelected judge would be well-suited
from this perspective, then, to play this role. Indeed, judges are
often viewed as the guardians of rights. But as discussed above,
most state court judges are elected,245 which takes away from
the claim that they are the best-situated decisionmaker in a context
that might demand greater insulation from the give and take of
electoral politics.
Second, there is little need for expertise here. Neither the
interests of the applicants nor the interests of the broader public
implicate anything particularly complicated or technical. On the
one hand, this is a point in favor of the generalist judge serving as
the decisionmaker, but on the other hand, it is a point in favor of
essentially any official serving as the decisionmaker. After all,
whichever official assigned the task would be capable of learning
the relevant criteria and of developing experience applying them.
Third, we come to the need for and desirability of
individualized discretion. If the interests at stake were generally in
equipoise, or hard to quantify or balance, then it would be
important to not only afford the decisionmaker wide discretion but
to assign the task to a decisionmaker comfortable with making such
judgment calls—that is, an entity that is otherwise entrusted by
interested individuals and by the general public with discretion in
other contexts, and one that has experience balancing
incommensurable values. A state court judge operating under a
broad, standardless statute would fit that bill. But the interests at
stake here are rarely so difficult to balance. In the vast majority of
cases, the applicant’s interest in self-expression is met on the other
side by no meaningful public interest. The name being chosen is not
so offensive or hateful as to be threatening to the public discourse,
about an elective office,” and noting that this “confirms limited prior empirical evidence
suggesting that lower-level elected judges are responsive to constituents”); cf. Gregory A.
Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for
Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248 (2004) (finding that elected judges become more punitive
as the judges approach reelection).
244. See Croley, supra note 216, at 727 (“Vindicating individual or minority
constitutional rights might prove too much for judges for whom reelection is important.”).
245. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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nor is the applicant attempting to subvert legal process. In those
cases, the exercise of discretion on the part of the decisionmaker is
at best unnecessary—the application should be granted. At worst,
it risks too many denials of applications based on the
decisionmaker’s personal sense of impropriety or, as discussed
above, based on the decisionmaker’s sense of what his electoral
constituency feels is appropriate. And in the few cases where the
public’s interest really is triggered, the applicant’s interest is almost
categorically swamped, and the appropriate course is to deny the
application. Again, little case-by-case discretion is needed. Of
course, while determining whether the applicant is attempting to
subvert the law is more or less a factual inquiry, there might well
be the need for some degree of discretion when it comes to
evaluating the hateful or offensive quality of a chosen name. But
that is just about the size of it, which means that any discretion that
is afforded to the decisionmaker must be carefully bounded to
avoid the risk of improper denials.
Putting these considerations together produces the conclusion
that, while the state judiciary is not a wholly improper place to put
the task of resolving name change applications, it is also not the best
place to put it.246 Instead, this may be an area where an unelected
bureaucrat could play an important role: Relatively insulated from
politics and qualified to determine whether an applicant satisfies
stated criteria without exercising much individualized discretion, a
true administrator could be the superior decisionmaker for this

246. An additional risk of making judges the assigned decisionmakers here is that some
judges may incorrectly perceive based on the very fact of that assignment that they are meant
to exercise wide discretion. For example, as one New York Civil Court judge put it, he “could
just as ‘blindly’ sign each and every application to change a name that comes before [him],”
but the fact that the legislature gave the job to him suggested to him that that is not what he
was meant to do. In re Bobrowich, No. 159/02, 2003 WL 230701, at *4 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Jan. 6,
2003). “If that were the legislative intent, it would be an administrative process” akin to the
issuance of a birth certificate where no one reviews the propriety of a birth name, rather than
one assigned to a judge. Id.
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quasi-administrative task.247 This, after all, is how Hawaii handles
these applications.248
But if judges are going to continue to be the decisionmakers,
then adequate safeguards need to be imposed in order to ensure
that they do not exercise too much discretion and do not bend too
far towards electoral accountability or personal caprice at the
expense of the applicant’s interests.249 Some states do a fairly good
job at imposing such fetters by statute. For example, Oklahoma,
discussed above, requires the judge to grant the name change
application except when the judge finds one of just two facts: that
the change is “sought for an illegal or fraudulent purpose,” or that
a “material allegation in the petition is false.”250 Virginia similarly
provides that the judge “shall” grant the application “unless the
evidence shows that the change of name is sought for a fraudulent
247. To be sure, bureaucrats are imperfect. They sometimes use their positions as frontline faces of authority to citizens to exert influence, provide incorrect information, offer
unsolicited opinions, and make other “normative interventions” with respect to individual
applications. Emens, supra note 40, at 824–27 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of
marital name changes). They also sometimes face resource or staffing constraints, and their
political independence is not impregnable. See Seifter, supra note 27, at 521–23. In rare
circumstances, they even sometimes flout constitutional commands outright. See Morgan
Gstalter, Anti-Gay Marriage County Clerk Kim Davis Loses Reelection in Kentucky, HILL (Nov. 6,
2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/415366-anti-gay-marriage-country-clerkkim-davis-loses-reelection-in-kentucky. But it is not the case that judges never engage in
similar behavior. See Alabama Chief Justice Tells Probate Judges to Refuse Same-Sex Marriage
Licenses, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/02/09/
384852553/alabama-chief-justice-tells-probate-judges-to-refuse-same-sex-marriage-licenses;
infra notes 291–293 and accompanying text (discussing judges and court staff deterring
minors from availing themselves of their rights in the abortion context). And bureaucrats
and administrators can still use their subject-matter expertise to serve as “site[s] of legal
transformation” and as sources “of liberation, rather than unmitigated repression.”
Marie-Amélie George, Bureaucratic Agency: Administering the Transformation of LGBT Rights,
36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 90 (2017); see id. at 131, 144 (discussing social workers who
allowed LGBT individuals to adopt and foster children or supported transgender children
in schools in conflict with outmoded state law). See generally Jennifer Nou, Civil Servant
Disobedience, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349 (2019) (discussing bureaucratic resistance). Finally, if
concerns about bureaucratic decisionmaking linger such that this task ought to remain with
judges, remember that bureaucrats are reviewed by courts. See infra notes 264–271 and
accompanying text. And if even that is not enough to allay those concerns, that simply makes
more salient the need to refine the judges’ decisionmaking process as articulated below.
248. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
249. Some judges recognize this risk of their own accord. See, e.g., In re Bacharach,
780 A.2d 579, 583 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“[A] request for a name change should
not be denied simply because a judge disputes the wisdom of the request or disagrees with
the reason for the change based on his or her personal views or philosophy.”).
250. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1634 (1953); see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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purpose or would otherwise infringe upon the rights of others.”251
Others, however, do not. All of the “may-issue” states discussed
above inherently fail to cabin the judge’s discretion,252 as do
the “shall-issue” states that vaguely require a finding of
“reasonable cause” or a “good reason” or the like before the issuing
obligation is triggered.253 In light of the foregoing analysis, the latter
jurisdictions should consider reforming their statutes to more
closely emulate the former. Doing so would better reflect and
respect the interests at stake and the nature of the decision
being made.254
But even the states that limit judges’ discretion in this arena
could bolster those limitations by expressly providing for appellate
review that is more active and that better fits the administrative
quality of the action. Now, judges’ decisions on name change
applications are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion.255
Where that standard of review applies, “the appellate court will not
reverse … unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous.”256 The most
common examples of the sorts of decisions that are subject to abuse
of discretion review include sentencing and evidentiary rulings,257
though those by no means define the universe. This form of review
is generally justified in a few ways. First, in these contexts, the judge
“‘has a wide range of choice as to what he decides,’” free from the
251. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-217(C) (2013).
252. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1402(c) (2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 527.270 (2011)
(“would be proper”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,271(3) (2008) (same); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 41.290(1) (2013) (“good reason exists”).
254. Cf. In re Bobrowich, No. 159/02, 2003 WL 230701, at *4 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Jan. 6, 2003)
(lamenting the fact that the name change statute “provides no guidance” and suggesting that
“[p]erhaps the legislature should amend the Civil Rights Law to provide the similar
guidance in regard to the names of natural persons as it has outlined for corporations”).
255. See, e.g., In re Mayol, 137 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004); In re Parrott,
392 S.E.2d 48, 48 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); In re Reed, 584 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); In
re Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind. 1974). Of course, a court can also conclude that the
judge has abused his discretion by making a decision contrary to the strict terms of a statute.
See, e.g., McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1168 n.3 (2017) (explaining that errors of law
are necessarily abuses of discretion); In re Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846, 847–48 (Ohio 2002)
(noting abuse-of-discretion standard but reversing denial of name change because applicant
satisfied defined statutory requirements).
256. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 552 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (quoting Spring Co. v. Edgar,
99 U.S. 645, 658 (1879)).
257. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (federal sentencing);
Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 141–42 (evidentiary rulings).
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sorts of constraints that require a particular outcome upon
application of a legal rule to a set of facts.258 Second, those contexts
involve “case-specific” decisions “that turn[] not on ‘a neat set of
legal rules,’ but instead on the application of broad standards to
‘multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist
generalization.’”259 Third, engaging in that sort of application
entails making individualized judgments—”fact-intensive, close
calls” with respect to relevance, burden, and the like—in which a
district court judge is said to have relative “expertise” compared to
an appellate judge relying on a cold record.260 Fourth, these
decisions are understood to necessitate “flexibility” for the district
court judge.261 Finally, the Supreme Court has intimated that this
form of review is appropriate because some of the decisions to
which it applies—though I would hasten to add that sentencing is
not one of them—are of relatively low consequence.262
None of that is or ought to be true with respect to name change
applications. There often are—or, as just discussed, should be—
specific criteria governing the judge’s decision and narrowing her
range of choice. Nothing about the question turns on the sorts of
close calls about, say, a witness’s demeanor, that have justified
abuse-of-discretion review in other contexts. Flexibility and
discretion are thus bugs, not features, in this context. And the
decision is not one of low consequence. For all of those reasons,
then, more searching review is called for.263
Fortunately, we already have a model for what that might look
like. Appellate courts do not extend such abuse-of-discretion
deference when the decisionmaker is, rather than a judge, an
administrative agency or bureaucrat. In the context of
258. McLane, 137 S. Ct. at 1169 (quoting Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the
Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971)).
259. Id. at 1167 (citations omitted) (first quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
232 (1983); and then quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561–62 (1988)).
260. Id. at 1167–68; see Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560 (holding that abuse of discretion review is
appropriate where “the district court may have insights not conveyed by the record,” such
as “whether particular evidence was worthy of being relied upon, or whether critical facts
could easily have been verified by the Government”).
261. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 562.
262. Id. at 563 (suggesting that abuse-of-discretion review is appropriate with respect
to awards of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act because the median award
“has been less than $3,000”).
263. Cf. Weinstein-Tull, supra note 27, at 1093 (similarly calling for greater scrutiny of
local courts’ decisions in dispute-resolution contexts).
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administrative decisionmakers, appellate courts instead demand a
showing of “reasoned decisionmaking.”264 At the federal level,
“virtually every form of agency action” is accompanied by a
judicial “demand for explicit reason-giving.”265 The same is
generally true at the state level.266 And while this review remains
deferential—”[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency”267—it has teeth. The
administrative decisionmaker is required to offer reasons that
“have some basis in the record,”268 that are articulated “in sufficient
detail to permit judicial review,”269 that match those the legislature
has meant to be considered,270 and that could “lead a reasonable
person to make” the same judgment.271
This may not seem like a particularly wide departure from
abuse-of-discretion review, and it is not. Both are deferential, and
when compared to truly de novo review, their differences appear
even less meaningful. But zoom in just a bit on the spectrum and
important distinctions emerge. Simply put: abuse-of-discretion
review does not require the decisionmaker to do anything more
than articulate some defensible basis for his decision. It does not
necessarily require him to articulate those reasons in a way that can
be—or actually is—backed up with evidence. Shifting to the form
of review familiar to administrative law would provide a number
of benefits.272 First, a reason-giving requirement coupled with
record review encourages “reflective findings, in furtherance of
evenhanded application of law, rather than impermissible whim,
improper influence, or misplaced zeal.”273 Or, as Justice Gorsuch
264. E.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 375 (1998).
265. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952,
962 (2007).
266. See, e.g., N.Y. A.P.A. § 307(1); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 11(8); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 34.05.461(3); MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT §§ 313, 318 (2010).
267. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402,
416 (1971).
268. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
269. Id.
270. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
271. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416).
272. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
273. Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
see Andrew E. Taslitz & Stephen E. Henderson, Reforming the Grand Jury to Protect Privacy in
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recently put it, “The principle that the government must support its
allegations with substantial evidence, not conclusions and secret
evidence, guards against arbitrary executive decisionmaking.”274 It
also guards against the bad side of electoral accountability—that is,
the concern that the judge will act to satisfy the electorate rather
than to fairly decide the application on its own terms. Second, it
prompts decisionmakers to step outside of their own experience
and to consider and confront their priors because they know that a
reviewer might not share those priors.275 Third, it reduces the
negative side effects of (presumed) expertise—the decisionmaker’s
sense that everyone sees the world as he does and his consequential
overconfidence in his decisions—and amplifies the positive aspects
of expertise.276 Finally, all of these benefits together lend legitimacy
and “increase[] confidence in the fairness” of the decisions
being made.277
One objection to this shift towards reason-giving and record
review is that it could make the decisionmaking process more
costly and time-consuming on the front end. Particularly at a time
when many state courts find themselves strapped for cash, it might
sound perverse to suggest they do more work.278 But it should also
sound perverse to suggest that important citizen interests be
Third Party Records, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 195, 219–20 (2014) (“Social science demonstrates that
actors believing they will be held accountable are more likely to work carefully and less likely
to engage in error, and thus are more likely to make sound decisions and less likely to make
irrational or ill-informed ones.”).
274. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing
Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1313–14 (1975)); see Kerry v.
Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2144 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that “an opportunity to
present relevant proofs and arguments [to] a neutral decisionmaker [who will engage in]
reasoned decisionmaking” “help[s] to guarantee that government will not make a decision
directly affecting an individual arbitrarily but will do so through the reasoned application of
a rule of law” (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004)).
275. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 588 (2002).
276. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 496–99 (2002).
277. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1761 (1975).
278. See Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 27, at 128 (observing that state civil courts
are “overwhelmed” and handle “98 percent of the tens of millions of civil legal cases filed
each year”); Judith Resnik, Courts and Economic and Social Rights/Courts as Economic and Social
Rights, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 259, 268 (Katharine G. Young ed.,
2018) (“Not only did court budgets decline after the 2008 recession, six states closed
courthouses a day a week; and nine sent judges on unpaid furloughs.”).
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afforded inadequately careful process in the name of saving money.
So, if one is truly concerned about the burden on state courts here,
the responses ought to be either to apply even more pressure on
state legislatures to fix these budgetary shortfalls, or to reallocate
this task to another entity with the resources to do it effectively.
Regardless, though, the more thoughtful first-line decisionmaking
on offer here need not be significantly more expensive. After all, the
issue, while weighty for the individual, is not exactly complex. The
record the judge would be expected to compile should therefore not
be particularly taxing to assemble.
In sum, requiring that judges articulate their reasons and root
those reasons in an evidentiary record when they make name
change application decisions would ameliorate some of the risks
associated with entrusting that decision to a state court judge.
It would also better reflect the quasi-administrative nature of
the decision.
2. Minors’ access to abortion
The analysis is similar with respect to minors’ access to abortion
without parental involvement. Yet again, the interests of the
applicant are profound and substantial, and they implicate rights
of constitutional dimension.279 And yet again, those are not the only
interests at stake. To be clear, the question in these cases is not, or
at least is not meant to be, whether the applicant is entitled to an
abortion or not.280 Rather, the question is whether the applicant is
entitled to an abortion without parental involvement. And that,
according to the Supreme Court, turns on whether the minor can
show “that she is mature enough and well enough informed to
make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician,
independently of her parents’ wishes,” or that, regardless, “the
desired abortion would be in her best interests.”281 So while the
minor has an interest in exercising her right to an abortion and to
279. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion);
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I), 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976).
280. Because the question is not meant to be whether the applicant is entitled to an
abortion or not, there is no need here to account for other sorts of interests that some might
argue weigh against a woman’s right to abortion access. Rather, the interests at stake in the
narrower question at issue in these cases revolve only around the minor’s access to an
abortion and her parents’ involvement in that medical choice.
281. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979).
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bodily autonomy, the other interests at stake include those of the
minor’s parents who might be interested in, say, directing the
upbringing of their children and ensuring that their children make
informed choices.282 The public, too, might care about protecting
the role of parents and ensuring that minors make mature
choices.283 And, to come full circle, the minor may have important
interests in not involving or notifying her parents—if, for example,
her parents are abusive or might throw her out of the family home
or worse.284 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, even if
“deference to parents may be permissible with respect to other
choices facing a minor, the unique nature and consequences of the
abortion decision make it inappropriate ‘to give a third party an
absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the
physician and his patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy.’”285
So we pose the question again: Who would be the right
decisionmaker in terms of accountability, expertise, and discretion?
Answering this question is made somewhat easier by focusing on the
Supreme Court’s guidance about what ought to animate the
inquiry—namely, the maturity of the minor and the degree to which
she is informed of her options. What institutional characteristics
make one best situated to evaluate these two questions?
First, take electoral accountability. Here, as with name change
applications, electoral accountability might be undesirable because
it could distort the decisionmaking process in pernicious ways.286
For example, an electorally accountable decisionmaker might be
more inclined to reject minors’ bypass applications in order to
282. See id. at 637 (“[T]he guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children
justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors.”); cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639
(1968) (“[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to
authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society.”).
283. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 634 (“The unique role in our society of the family, the
institution by which ‘we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral
and cultural,’ requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility
to the special needs of parents and children.” (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio,
431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (citation omitted))).
284. See, e.g., Redden, supra note 81 (offering the example of a young woman in
Alabama who sought a judicial bypass because, among other things, “[h]er father had told
her that if she ever came home pregnant he would kill her”).
285. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
286. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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demonstrate his anti-abortion or “pro-family” bona fides. From this
perspective, an unelected judge would be a well-positioned
decisionmaker, but the fact that most state court judges are elected
should raise concerns about excessive political accountability.287
The fact that parents have some interests at stake does not do much
to explain away this concern; after all, electoral accountability
means accountability to the broader electorate, not just the parents.
And while the danger from the minors’ perspective is by far the
more real-world one, broad political accountability at least in
theory risks interfering with the parents’ interests too. At least on
the face of things, it is plausible that the electorally accountable
decisionmaker would put a thumb on the scale in favor of minors’
bypass applications in order to demonstrate his pro-choice bona
fides to that electorate. So neither the minor’s interests nor the
parents’ interests provide much support for a politically
accountable decisionmaker. Instead, both of them suggest a role for
a more politically insulated decisionmaker.
What might provide the necessary justification for the
electorally accountable decisionmaker, then, is the public’s interest.
While the set of possible name change decisions that are not in the
public interest is small and somewhat easily drawn, the set of
decisions in this context that are not in the public interest is, at a
minimum, subject to much more contestation. Of course, as just
discussed, the public might well care about increasing or
decreasing the number of minors receiving abortions without
parental involvement, full stop. But that is not my meaning here
because, given the way that the Court has framed the inquiry, that
is not how the public’s interest is meant to be understood. Instead,
the public’s interest ought to be understood as ensuring that those
minors who do receive abortions without parental consent are only
those who are mature enough and well-enough informed to do so,
however many that might be.288 In comparison to the name change
287. See Canes-Wrone et al., supra note 243, at 224, 228 (finding that, in states with
judicial retention and nonpartisan elections, “a 10 percentage point increase in pro-life public
opinion increases the likelihood of a pro-life vote [by the elected judge] by 8-10 percent[],”
and concluding that “retention elections encourage judges to be responsive to public opinion
on hot-button issues”); Croley, supra note 216, at 727–28 (“The protection of abortion rights
in judicial districts where the protection of such rights is disfavored by a majority
constitutes another example where the protection of constitutional rights may be threatened
by electoral accountability.”).
288. See supra notes 281–285 and accompanying text.

783

2.POLLACK_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/27/2021 1:44 AM

46:3 (2021)

context, this version of the public interest might admit of a slightly
wider and more contestable band of possible “wrong” answers for
which the public might justifiably want to punish an erring
decisionmaker. And framed in this way, the public’s role needs not
come at the expense of the minor or the parents but would instead
give the minor (or parents) the ability to call on the electorate to
help her (or them) vindicate her (or their) interests.
On the other hand, though, the public always has an interest in
ensuring that rights-holders receive the protection to which they
are entitled, but no more, lest that protection impact the interests of
others.289 We do not generally say as a result that all decisions made
about rights must be or even should be made by politically
accountable actors. Doing so would prove far too much. The
conclusion, then, is similar to the name change context:
accountability is of questionable value in a decisionmaker here.
Next, what of expertise? Now, in contrast to the name change
context, there is a fairly meaningful role for expertise. The inquiry
in question requires the decisionmaker to understand child
psychology, medicine, and perhaps more. This is not to say that a
generalist cannot develop such expertise over time, but it would be
easier for the decisionmaker to do so if his or her job was sciencebased and centered around children and their needs.
Third and finally, we turn to the question of individualized
discretion. In contrast again to the name change context, where the
interests at stake are fairly easy to weigh, it must be admitted that
striking such a balance is not as easy here. Whereas questions like
whether a name change is being sought to evade justice have an
objective, verifiable answer, questions like whether a particular
minor is sufficiently mature might not. As a result, it is hard to
credibly say that no discretion should be afforded to the
decisionmaker. But the foregoing discussion makes clear at the
same time that the decisionmaker’s discretion must be strictly
limited to the question at hand: the minor’s level of maturity and
information. The evil to be avoided most of all is the decisionmaker
289. Cf. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 998 F. Supp. 2d 912, 935 (N.D. Ind. 2013), aff’d,
743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Univ. of Notre Dame v.
Burwell, 575 U.S. 901 (2015), and aff’d sub nom. 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The public—
however one chooses to define that vague term—certainly has an interest in the vindication
of First Amendment rights. But it also has an interest in the full enforcement of duly
enacted laws.”).
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substituting his or her feelings about abortion access vel non for a
careful evaluation of this minor’s circumstances.290 Indeed, there is
no shortage of reports of judges denying minors’ bypass requests
on grounds other than those provided by law—that is, having
nothing to do with the minor’s maturity or circumstances and
instead having to do with the judge’s beliefs about abortion and
about those who perform abortions.291 One court officer in Alabama
reportedly said,
“My judge is anti-abortion, and he doesn’t believe a child should
have this done without her parents. You have the right to file . . . .
But that doesn’t mean he will grant it. We had one [case] one
time . . . and her doctor advised her to have an abortion for
medical reasons, and [the judge] still would not grant it.”292

Similar stories arise in other states as well.293 Given the unavoidable
fact that this particular issue is not only contentious but one about
which government officials routinely push the envelope in an effort
to pare back access,294 it is crucial to ensure that the necessary
discretion not be unfettered, and that those fetters be enforced.
290. When Justice Souter was a trial court judge in New Hampshire, he spoke out
against a New Hampshire parental consent and judicial bypass bill and specifically noted
this danger. See Suellyn Scarnecchia & Julie Kunce Field, Judging Girls: Decision Making in
Parental Consent to Abortion Cases, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 75, 83–84 (1995) (quoting John
Milne, Souter Note Helped Sink ‘81 N.H. Bill on Abortion; Letter Seen Offering No Clue to Personal
Views, BOS. GLOBE, July 26, 1990, at 1).
291. See Redden, supra note 81 (discussing, for example, a case in which a judge denied
a bypass petition because she felt that the abortion provider was a “butcher” who just wanted
“this young lady’s money,” and in which that decision was affirmed on appeal);
HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: HOW COURTS FAIL PREGNANT MINORS 85 (2007)
(quoting one court employee in Alabama saying, “I can 100 percent guarantee you that [the
judge] will not grant [the petition]. The family court judge does not believe it is an issue that
should be decided by the court. The judge will not grant it; it’s the judge’s decision. He will
not grant it.”).
292. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 291. At a bypass hearing, a judge reportedly said to the
minor appearing before him, “What you have asked the Court to allow you to do is
something that is extremely serious and fatal to your child.” Id. at 129. And another judge is
known to tell minors, “This is an enormous decision, and I don’t want you to make it.” Id.
293. See, e.g., Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 290, at 86, 91–92 (collecting similar stories
in other states); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 291, at 116–17 (same).
294. See, e.g., Gabe Rosenberg, A Bill Banning Most Abortions Becomes Law in Ohio, NPR
(Apr. 11, 2019, 6:37 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/11/712455980/a-bill-banningmost-abortions-becomes-law-in-ohio (observing that Ohio became the sixth state to outlaw
abortion once a fetal heartbeat can be detected, which is long before the timeframe set out in
Roe v. Wade, and quoting a legislator as saying, “Will there be a lawsuit? Yeah, we are
counting on it . . . . We’re counting on it. We’re excited about it.”).
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So as with name changes, the state judiciary may not be the best
place to put this particular task.295 Both contexts raise similar
concerns about political accountability that cut against elected
judges serving as the decisionmakers, and while there is a stronger
argument for discretion in the abortion context (which might
militate in favor of the judiciary), there is also a stronger argument
for expertise (which might militate against it). Once again, then, this
may be an area where an unelected, expert bureaucrat like an
official in the state’s department of health or department of child
services could play an important role.296
But whether the decisionmakers remain the judges or are
instead expert bureaucrats, strict limits must be imposed on the
exercise of their discretion. Formally, at least, most states do a better
job here than they do with name change applications. As discussed
above, most states provide that the judge “shall” waive the
applicable parental involvement requirement if the judge
determines that such parental involvement would “not be in the
best interest of the minor” or that “the minor is sufficiently mature
to decide whether to have an abortion.”297 Some even list specific
factors the judge must consider.298 And most states go a step further
and require the judge to include “specific factual findings” in
support of their orders.299 By limiting the grounds on which the
judge’s decision can rest and by requiring the judge to make
specific findings in support of those limited inquiries, these statutes
impose fetters on the judge and thus—again, formally—minimize
the risk of improper discretion or excessive political influence. In
light of the importance of such precautions, states certainly ought
to maintain them. Every state would also do well to make clear that
whatever factors it requires the judge to consider are exclusive of
other considerations—like, say, the judge’s views about abortion.

295. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
296. Here, in particular, one might expect that a professional in a state’s department of
child services, for example, might use his or her expertise to prioritize the welfare of the
minor applicant in the face of political efforts to interfere with her rights. Cf. George, supra
note 247, at 85–86. Working with such a professional might also be a less intimidating and
frightening experience for the minor applicant than appearing before a judge. See supra note
81 and accompanying text.
297. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-707(1)(a) (West 2020); see supra Section I.B.
298. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(c)(1) (2019); supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
299. § 13-22-707(1)(a); see supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
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But the more important reform would be to make sure that
these formal limits on judges’ discretion truly operate to limit
that discretion. One important way of doing that would be to
explicitly provide for appellate review that is more active and that
better fits the administrative quality of the action. Specifically, just
as with name changes, these states should require the judge
to articulate the reasons in support of his decision and to compile
a factual record that provides real support for those reasons,
and should empower appellate courts to promptly reverse if
these requirements are not complied with.300 Such a reform
would ensure, for example, that bypass denials based on little
more than the judge’s views about abortion—when the law calls
instead for an evaluation of the minor’s circumstances—would not
be affirmed.301
3. Attorney admission and discipline
Finally, turning to bar admission and discipline,302 there is a
somewhat stronger argument that judges are the right
decisionmakers here. The interests at stake are primarily those of
the attorney (or would-be attorney) and those of their clients or
future clients in the broader public. That is, as with any licensed or
regulated profession, the governing body must protect the public
from unqualified or unscrupulous professionals and must at the
same time deal fairly with those participating in or seeking to
participate in the profession.303 So subject individuals have an
interest in receiving and keeping their licenses to practice law,304
and clients and the public have an interest in the wrong people not
receiving or retaining those licenses. The public’s interest here is
thus somewhat greater than that of the public in the name change
or abortion contexts. That is, an admission or discipline decision
300. See supra notes 255–276 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
302. See supra Section I.C.
303. Other attorneys might be said to have some interest in the reputation of the
profession and in the proper enforcement of the profession’s rules, but that interest is, for
present purposes at least, mostly accounted for by the subject attorney and by the clients and
future clients.
304. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (citation omitted) (“Suspension of issued
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees.
In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process
required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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that unwarrantedly favors the attorney might harm more people—
in the sense of subjecting them to deficient or insidious attorneys—
than a name change or abortion decision that unwarrantedly favors
the applicant ever could.
On the electoral accountability front, then, the notion that the
bar gatekeeper ought to be accountable to the public has some
resonance. Indeed, as discussed above, there have often been calls
to move the regulation of attorneys out of the courts and into the
accountable legislative sphere for precisely this reason.305 On the
other hand, some (mostly judges and attorneys) have argued that,
as then-Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo put it, “[If] the house is to
be cleaned, it is for those who occupy and govern it, rather than
strangers, to do the noisome work.”306 On this view, it is
emphatically not the job of the public, but rather of the courts
themselves, to regulate and discipline the bar. And the public
should trust the bar, the story goes, because attorneys as a group,
and the judges who come from their ranks and govern the bar,
ought to have little interest in degrading their reputation by
association with such bad actors.307 Yet another rejoinder often
offered to the prospect of more electorally accountable control of
the bar is that too much accountability is in fact undesirable. On an
individual level, just as with name changes and abortion, a given
attorney or attorney candidate might worry that electoral
accountability would come at the expense of his own interest by
distorting the decisionmaker’s consideration of his case. And on a
more systemic level, attorneys as a whole might worry that
“legislative regulation, subject to political influence, would impair
the independence of lawyers” and make them beholden to
dominant political forces rather than to their clients and to
the law.308
So, when it comes to electoral accountability, we have a more
mixed bag than we do in the name change and abortion arenas
where there is a simpler story to tell about the pernicious side
305. See supra notes 120–122 and accompanying text. Even the American Bar
Association has recognized this danger, although it has always vehemently resisted
addressing it through legislative oversight. See Devlin, supra note 110, at 921–31.
306. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 493 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.).
307. See id. at 488 (observing that “[t]he bar as a whole felt the sting of the discredit thus
put upon its membership by an unscrupulous minority”).
308. Devlin, supra note 110, at 930 (referencing concerns articulated by the ABA).
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of accountability. That pernicious side exists here too, but with
more upside. But when we turn to expertise and discretion, the
argument in favor of judges serving as the relevant decisionmakers
is amplified. As with the abortion context, there is a meaningful role
for expertise—expertise in the norms and rules of attorney conduct,
in the problems that attorneys and clients encounter, and in the
ethical qualifications required of attorneys. But unlike the abortion
context, the judges are among those who possess that expertise.
And because many attorney discipline and admission questions
involve gray areas that necessarily call for the exercise of
professional judgment, it is important that the relevant
decisionmaker be in a position to call upon her own lawyerly
judgment and discretion. State court judges are well suited to carry
out that role.
In contrast, then, to the other two quasi-administrative roles
that state court judges play, this one carries some added
justifications in the first instance. It is far from perfect, though, and
calls for broader accountability must be taken seriously given the
serious public interests at stake. Short of reallocating the
decisionmaking authority—which would raise problems of its
own—it is therefore important for the bar admission and discipline
process to be transparent to the public and to feature clear
standards that are rigorously enforced.309 If state courts are failing
to meet that burden on their own, the imposition of minimum
standards as guardrails ought to be considered by legislatures.
But a larger problem lurks that is unique to this context: there
is little to no avenue for meaningful appellate review. While most
of the concerns driving calls for greater accountability are rooted in
the public interest, the simultaneously significant interest of the
attorney or candidate attorney means that the possibility of an
erroneous decision against the attorney cannot be ignored.310 The
foregoing analysis of the other two quasi-administrative contexts
discussed the ways in which states need to ensure that applicants
can have adverse decisions reviewed for more than mere abuse-ofdiscretion review in higher state courts, but at least as a structural
matter, such review is at least available in those arenas. In this
309. The American Bar Association has made similar calls for transparency and has
driven disciplinary reforms in that direction. See id. at 928–29.
310. See, e.g., Leaf v. Sup. Ct. of State of Wis., 979 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1992) (attorney
alleging bias in, and raising constitutional challenges to, disciplinary procedures he faced).
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context, by contrast, the decisionmaker is usually not a trial-level
judge but is often instead the state’s highest court.311 In-state
appellate review is therefore often not available at all.
Due to a doctrine of federal jurisdiction, federal court review is
generally not available either.312 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
generally understood to prohibit relitigation in federal courts
(besides the Supreme Court) of a case decided in state court.313
Indeed, the “Feldman” half of Rooker-Feldman was itself a case about
bar admission decisions. Marc Feldman applied for a license to
practice law in the District of Columbia and was rejected by the
District’s highest court, the Court of Appeals. He then filed a suit in
federal district court challenging the Court of Appeals’ decision.
The district court dismissed his complaint, concluding that it could
not “review[] an order of a jurisdiction’s highest court.”314 The D.C.
Circuit disagreed, characterizing the admission decision as an
administrative decision rather than a judicial one.315 The Supreme
Court, however, agreed with the district court, reasoning that the
bar admission proceedings at issue were in fact “judicial” and that,
accordingly, no review could lie in federal court.316 The upshot,
then, is that attorney candidates and attorneys who have been
aggrieved by a state high court’s admission or discipline decision
are without any opportunity to have that decision reviewed by

311. See Barry Friedman & James E. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, from the Ground Up, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1129, 1132 (1999). But see N.Y. JUD. L. § 90 (McKinney 2020) (providing
that the intermediate court of appeals has power to admit and discipline attorneys).
312. An aggrieved party can seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court from the state
high court’s judgment, but that is “too rare to be meaningful.” Friedman & Gaylord, supra
note 311, at 1132 n.20. One source estimates that the Supreme Court grants between one and
two percent of all petitions filed, and an individual seeking mere error-correction is
exceptionally unlikely to fit the bill. See Adam Feldman, Cert Analytics, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS
(Jan. 10, 2017), https://empiricalscotus.com/2017/01/10/cert-analytics/.
313. See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman prohibits “state-court losers” from seeking federal
“district court review and rejection” of “state-court judgments”); Friedman & Gaylord,
supra note 311, at 1134.
314. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 470.
315. Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1981), vacated sub nom.
D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (acknowledging that “review of a final
judgment of the highest judicial tribunal of a state is vested solely in the Supreme Court of
the United States,” but concluding that the district court had jurisdiction here because the
bar proceedings “were not judicial”).
316. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 481; see supra note 123.
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anyone, save for the remote possibility of a grant of certiorari in the
U.S. Supreme Court.
In light of the interests at stake, this is an intolerable result. For
one thing, individuals subject to other professional licensing and
regulatory bodies do have the opportunity to appeal adverse
decisions to a higher state court, because the decision would not
have been made in the first instance by that high court.317 The
anomaly that the attorney licensing organization is the high court
does not on its own justify the different result. One option, then, as
Barry Friedman and James Gaylord have argued, is “to remove the
attorney disciplinary process from the state supreme courts.”318
That would certainly solve this particular problem, but it might
raise problems of its own. That is, for the reasons discussed above,
the state courts might actually be well-suited to handle these issues;
other state agencies might be less well-suited to do so. Perhaps
attorney admission and discipline decisions could more widely be
moved to lower state courts, as in states like New York, but
concerns about disuniformity, or about individual judges making
admissions decisions that would put attorneys before other judges
who might not have admitted that attorney had they had the
choice, might militate against doing so.319 After all, in contrast to
the name change and the abortion contexts, the admitted attorneys
will be repeat players in the state court system, interacting with the
judges themselves. This introduces a more meaningful systemic
interest in reducing the number of gatekeepers and thus reducing
the potential for inconsistent decisions. Another option might be to
provide a special state court of appeal in which review could be had
of the bar decisions of the state high court.320 But this work-around,
while perhaps effective, is cumbersome.

317. See Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 311, at 1163 (“The ironic result of Feldman is
that lawyers and judges in licensing and disciplinary cases receive less process due them
than any other individuals or entities in similar circumstances receive.”).
318. Id. at 1171.
319. In New York, attorneys are admitted and disciplined by the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court, which is the state’s intermediate court. See N.Y. JUD. L. § 90 (McKinney
2020). Attorneys facing discipline “shall have the right to appeal to the court of appeals from
a final order of any appellate division.” Id. § 90(8).
320. Cf. Court of the Judiciary Overview, ALA. JUD. SYS., http://judicial.alabama.gov/
appellate/judiciary (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (providing for a special court in which judicial
officers may be tried for violations of canons of judicial conduct).
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The cleanest solution, then, might be to overrule Feldman, not
just because Feldman is deeply mistaken on its own terms, but
because the foregoing analysis reveals that doing so would yield
important results on the ground. To be clear, doing so need not
mean abandoning the Rooker-Feldman doctrine itself: judicial
decisions of state high courts should remain immune from review
in federal district courts.321 But overruling Feldman would simply
recognize that the decision made by the D.C. Court of Appeals in
that case was, contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling, not judicial
but rather administrative—or, at least, to use the language of this
Article, quasi-administrative. As Justice Stevens aptly put it in his
dissent in the case, the D.C. Court of Appeals, when handling
Feldman’s admission application, “performed no more and no less
than the administrative function of a licensing board.”322 Moreover,
overruling Feldman would better reflect the interests at stake and
the nature of the decision at issue. After all, if Feldman were
seeking a license to practice medicine or to braid hair, he would
have initially appeared before a state administrative agency (one
that was indisputably administrative) and would have been able to
appeal from an adverse decision to some court.323 As Friedman and
Gaylord put it, “[i]t is just happenstance that when the applicant is
a lawyer, the administrative agency in many states is also the
highest court.”324 That is, the Court in Feldman seems to have been
distracted by the fact that a court was the decisionmaker. But
recognizing, as this Article illustrates, just how many functions are
321. This is not to say that related critiques of the unwarranted expansion of the
doctrine are mistaken, because they are not. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005) (“Variously interpreted in the lower courts, the doctrine has
sometimes been construed to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases,
overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction
exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law . . . .”);
VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., 951 F.3d 397, 404–09 (6th Cir. 2020) (Sutton, J.,
concurring) (similarly lamenting that federal courts still erroneously “pull[] into [RookerFeldman’s] vortex . . . many things the rule does not do”). But rather than being centered on
expansion, the critique offered here is centered on Feldman itself and is therefore aimed at
reframing the boundaries of the heartland of Rooker-Feldman.
322. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 489 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 311, at 1172 (calling it “obvious” that Justice Stevens
was correct).
323. A litigant seeking to come to federal court would still, of course, have to articulate
some federal question, whether it be procedural due process, equal protection, or the like.
Feldman’s original complaint raised due process challenges. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 469 n.3.
324. Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 311, at 1172.
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truly served by the state courts puts the Court’s error in bold relief.
And its confusion is no excuse for continuing to relegate attorneys
to lesser process than other regulated professionals enjoy.325
***
With respect to the legislative and law enforcement functions
analyzed above, it was fair to conclude that the departures from the
traditional judge’s dispute-resolution role were, at least in some
applications, moderately if imperfectly defensible. When it comes
to these quasi-administrative tasks, by contrast, the accountability,
expertise, and discretion considerations point in a more troubling
direction. While judges are often electorally accountable, and while
that helped support their quasi-legislative roles, that fact cuts
against their being the appropriate decisionmaker here, where there
are concerns that they will privilege the preferences of the
electorate over the claim of the applicant. This concern arises with
particular strength in the name change and abortion contexts, as
illustrated, but it is likely to animate many similar quasiadministrative functions for the simple fact that these are the
contexts in which citizens are approaching their government
seeking permission to do something that might pit them against
others in their community. Moreover, many such functions
demand subject-matter expertise to which judges—with the
exception of attorney admission and discipline—have no particular
claim. Finally, and again due to the nature of the task, these are
arenas in which one might justifiably worry that the decision not be
too discretionary lest the decisionmaker’s personal views unduly
motivate her decision.
For all of these reasons, it is worth considering whether to
reallocate these functions to other institutions of state government.
But even if they remain with the judges, it is crucial to mitigate
these concerns by tightly defining the criteria the judges are to
evaluate and by holding them to those criteria by imposing reasongiving obligations and by enforcing those obligations with rigorous
appellate review. And where that review cannot be had in state
courts, the federal courts ought to be opened to it.
325. See id. at 1173; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 490 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The fact that the
licensing function in the legal profession is controlled by the judiciary is not a sufficient
reason to immunize allegedly unconstitutional conduct from review in the federal courts.”).
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CONCLUSION
The state courts are responsible for a wide range of functions
beyond traditional “judging.” Whether they have been assigned
that role by state law or have taken it on for themselves, the result
is that the state courts must be understood and evaluated, not
simply as sites of dispute resolution, but as institutions of state
government—and ones that are far more complicated and
multifaceted than previously recognized. As this Article has
shown, careful examination of the functions served by state courts
reveals that the hats the state courts wear come in a variety of
shapes and sizes. But all implicate important interests and pose
potential institutional design challenges. It is therefore critical to
ensure that state law and higher courts—to say nothing of scholars,
citizens, and policy advocates—see the state courts for what they
truly are.
Reorienting our thinking about state courts around their more
complicated reality means paying far more careful attention to
which hat a state court is wearing in a particular context. It means
shaping the architecture of decisionmaking one function at a time,
taking concerted steps to guide, review, or limit the court in the
ways that will best reflect the most desirable decisionmaking
processes in each arena and that will best respect the values and
rights at stake. And, in the end, it means making more conscious
choices about which tasks those courts ought to be responsible for.
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